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ABSTRACT

VIELLEICHT HIER, UM ZU SAGEN: BILDUNG AND ELEGY
IN THE DUINESER ELEGIEN, DU CÔTÉ DE CHEZ SWANN,
AND MISÉRABLE MIRACLE

MAY 2016
EMILY HEILKER, B.A. UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Jim Hicks

In the wake of the industrialization, urbanization, and global conflicts of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Europe was forced to call into question its
Enlightenment faith. In particular, Bildung—as the cultural education of the individual
that emerged out of the Enlightenment—lost its footing amidst experience’s new texture
of trauma. This thesis will examine Rilke’s Duineser Elegien, Proust’s Du côté de chez
Swann, and Michaux’s Misérable miracle as each work pertains to and reconceives of the
intertwining of Bildung and elegy, as a literary form both underpinned by and
unconvinced of Bildung. For them, I will argue, elegy served as a potential form for rewriting historical indifference and for preparing, through limit-experience and loss,
linguistic antidotes for the elision of difference produced in history’s wake.
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INTRODUCTION

In his 1940 “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” Walter Benjamin notes how
the “current amazement that the things we are experiencing are ‘still’ possible in the
twentieth is not philosophical”1 and that such “amazement is not the beginning of
knowledge.”2 The “things” to which he was referring were, of course, the various
iterations of fascism on the rise in Europe. Their prevalence flew in the face of
assumptions about progress that had been operational in Europe since the Enlightenment.
They suggested that “the tradition of the oppressed”—in which “the ‘state of emergency’
in which we live is not the exception but the rule”3—might offer up a more accurate
picture of the world. Chiefly, this residual desire for Aufklärung manifested itself in a
sustained faith in the possibility of progress and of knowledge’s expansion—in other
words, in the continued success and benefits of scientific and technological mastery of
both the external world (in the tradition of Bacon’s scientific method) and the internal
one (in the tradition of Locke’s exploration of human understanding). In the wake of the
events of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, even these dregs of
Enlightenment faith were called into question.
Objections that started out small grew big. Technological advancements that had
propelled the growth of Western Europe—and chiefly Belgium, France, and Germany on
the continent4—in the nineteenth century also came to implicate changes in social and

1

Benjamin, 257.
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Roessler, 122
2

1

economic structures that were not always positive. While industrial capitalism could be
credited with urbanization, increased birth rates, and reduced death rates,5 it had likewise
combined with nationalism to compel Europe into an expansionist land race
(colonization) and arms race (the burgeoning military-industrial complex).6 Furthermore,
these endeavors had subsumed the population with their need for labor, consumers, and
soldiers. As a result, the distance between labor and capital, the need to fold into the
rhythm and tempo of mechanical life, and mandatory military training7 countered any
sense of control produced by technological developments. This pressure and sociopolitical reorganization—though only drawing general attention much later and after it
was too late for circumspect action—then culminated, in the twentieth century, in two
world wars.8 The first reinforced progress’ failure, using new technology to trump all
preceding wars in bloodiness and brutality, and the second only escalated the violence
through mechanization as manifested in the extermination camps and through the atomic
bomb.
The twentieth century, then, had to face not only the failure of progress, but also
the question of why. Science, knowledge—the supposed bedrock of the new civilization,
of the world exposed, comprehended—had become destructive, and the cause for that
seemed to rest in humanity. Guilt, shame, and horror were joined by a sense of
disorientation and a deep need to re-evaluate the assumptions of Bildung, “education in

The population of Europe “increased dramatically from 270 million in 1850 to over 460 million by 1910”
(ibid., 156).
6
“Per capita spending for arms more than doubled in France between 1870 and 1914, while Germany’s
spending increased more than sixfold” (ibid., 209)
7
Ibid.
8
For a more extended discussion of the interrelation of industrialization, modernization, the world wars,
and the rise of fascism please see Robert O. Paxton’s The Anatomy of Fascism.
5
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and through culture,”9 that had developed for the last two centuries, along with the
scientific ideals of the Enlightenment. After all, how could people have committed
themselves to the unconscionable madness of the Holocaust, Nazism, fascism, and
totalitarianism in an array of manifestations? Any sense of having come to understand the
human psyche or of being able to educate a proper, humanist subject and citizen faded.
It is for this complex of reasons that this century is often known for, and
approached in terms of, trauma. Blow after blow transformed the landscape, literally and
figuratively, and the mode of preparing for these hits, Bildung, had proven itself to be, at
best, ineffective or, at worst, the problem. It should be no surprise then if the same
century also becomes known for its elegies. After all, the elegy, as a form of ritualizing
grief into mourning, serves as a potential tool for navigating aftermaths. Indeed, as The
New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics puts it, “the number of works in the
elegiac mode makes it clear that in poetry the twentieth century has been a ‘distinctly
elegiac age.’”10
Although the elegy has a long and varied premodern history, my focus will be on
its post-Renaissance ascendancy; as critic Theodore Ziolkowski notes, “during the
eighteenth century it became once again one of the most popular literary forms in
Europe.”11 This version of the elegy as a genre is primarily characterized, not by specific
features12, but rather by “a movement: from grief to consolation.”13 That is, the elegy

9

SEP
The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, 324.
11
Ziolkowski, 62.
12
This point is up for debate. Ziolkowski, to whom I have made reference, makes a case for the “classical
German elegy” (1795-1950), which does remain in contact with the elegiac distiches of the Greek tradition
and shares several tropes across many of its manifestations. However, The New Princeton Encyclopedia of
Poetry and Poetics argues that the German elegy is particularly detached from an elegiac tradition when
considered alongside other European variants—the Duino Elegies being a notable exception and perhaps a
10

3

follows the writer, usually a mourner, through the process of grieving and towards a
reconciliation with death, particular or general. This reconciliation is thought to take
place by what “has been well described by Abbie Findlay Potts [as] anagnorisis” 14:
Insofar as this term is employed by literary critics—variously translated from the
Greek to mean ‘recognition’, ‘revelation’, ‘discovery’ or ‘disclosure’—it tends to
be used in relation to drama. But if anagnorisis may be said to crown the plot of
dramatic and epic poetry, and to reward the logic of didactic poetry, it is ‘the very
goal’ of elegy, ‘determining the whole procedure’15
The writer of elegy, in other words, undergoes an experience that imbues him or her with
new insight that makes the bearing of death not as difficult as it had been previously (i.e.
before the writing of the elegy), although the form of this experience is not necessarily
identified in the course of the work, and is instead at times transposed into the literary
process. One may conclude, then, that anagnorisis highlights the functional (rather than
literary or pleasure-based) nature of the genre: elegy is a form of writing meant to do
work.
In this fashion, Bildung and elegy are deeply intertwined. Indeed, the elegy, as a
processual work, “is essentially the poetic form created in response to the concept of
Bildung as defined by bourgeois humanism,” 16 which otherwise emerges in the fictional
form of the Bildungsroman, starting with Goethe’s Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, and in
various pedagogical endeavors. For my purposes—an exploration of the way in which
Bildung functions or does not function following the challenge of the trauma of the

product of Rilke’s contact with France. For more on the history of the elegy in the German language
tradition, see The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, 323.
13 The Cambridge Introduction to Poetic Form, 101.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16
Ziolkowski, 286-7.
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twentieth century—between Bildungsroman and elegy, I favor the latter. The
Bildungsroman, as a starting place, is too ill-equipped to deal with the possibility that
progress may fail. Indeed, well into the twentieth century it still frequently operates as if
it could portray the development of the bourgeois subject and citizen without becoming a
caricature of itself. Elegy, on the other hand, is designed to absorb shock, the signature of
twentieth-century, traumatic experience.17 It already comprehends the violence of
learning—that the struggle is, “on the one hand, how to access, how not to foreclose the
crisis, and, on the other hand, how to contain it,” to borrow from Shoshanna Felman’s
writing on the intersection of pedagogy and trauma. 18
To think of it another way: the elegy, in the twentieth century, exists not just as a
genre but also as a mode. As the category of the bourgeois subject breaks down, so too do
the literary genres through which he is to be educated. Thus, elegy becomes an expansive
attitude infiltrating other forms of writing, though always maintaining the same concern
with mourning and anagnorisis. Or to think of it yet another way: with the traumatic
structure of shock dominating modern European experience, any writing that aims to
approach the shaping of modern subjectivity must confront the elegiac challenge. They
must be able to handle the subject negotiating its limits, the limit-experiences during
which human boundaries are maxed out and the relationship between the individual and
the social is at stake. For the authors I will be discussing here, that means that the elegy
(and the elegiac) serves as the occasion for patching—through whatever permutation of
life and art—excess into the fabric of narrative.

17
18

For more on “shock,” see Benjamin’s “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire.”
Felman, 54.
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Keeping this understanding of the elegy in mind, I would like to make some brief
remarks about the authors and works I will be focusing on here: Rainer Maria Rilke’s
Duineser Elegien (Duino Elegies), Marcel Proust’s Du côté de chez Swann (Swann’s
Way), and Henri Michaux’s Misérable miracle (Miserable Miracle). Of these texts only
one (Michaux’s) was written after WWII and in the wake of the collapse of illusions of
progress.19 The other two were composed in the early 1910s-20s20 under the auspices of
intense urbanization and industrialization21 and increased warmongering22. Before
Bildung collapsed entirely, it was already breaking, and the sense of the lie of history was
already felt.
That aside, these texts also share several other features: the time period of their
writing, the fact that each piece implicates and mourns the death of a specific person (a
friend, a lover, and a wife, respectively), their retroactive situation within high
modernism, their shared interest in and interrogation of the mimetic, and the fact that the
process of writing for each work was protracted and required extended editing or
iterations or both. In these three works, each writer is engaged in a reinvention of the
space of revelation, as they strove to untangle some of the consequences of Bildung’s
19

Michaux began to take mescaline in 1955 and first published on the subject in Misérable miracle in
1956. See Mescaline 55, 9.
20
See the chronologies in the Cambridge Companion to Rilke and the Cambridge Companion to Proust.
21
Both Proust and Rilke were deeply concerned with the idea of the “city,” which recurs frequently in Du
côté de chez Swann and the Duineser Elegien (not to mention in Rilke’s Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte
Laurids Brigge, to which the Elegien are largely a response). For more on the city in these volumes, please
see Gerald Gillespie’s Proust, Mann, Joyce in the Modernist Context, Edward Timms’ and David Kelley’s
Unreal City: Urban Experience in Modern European Literature and Art, and Eleanor E ter Horst’s “Urban
Pastoral: Tradition and Innovation in Apollinaire’s ‘Zone’ and Rilke’s ‘Zehnte Duineser Elegie.”
22
It is important to keep in mind that World War I did not pop up out of nowhere nor did the assassination
of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the subsequent collapse of the network of treaties in Europe trigger the
war by itself. Rather, “it is a definite possibility that Europe was already by 1913 standing on the brink of
war. By this time many Europeans appear to have viewed a major conflict as inevitable. The division of the
major powers into two blocs, however uncertain the respective commitments may have seemed, were
regarded by many as providing the basis for an inevitable major conflict” (Roessler, 216). In other words,
World War I was as much a symptom of modernization as it was a cause of the trauma that would follow in
its wake.
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failure. I consider the strategies they used—not to explain the damage or solve it, but to
contain it—an important goal that this essay should itself adopt.
In the first chapter, I will be looking at Rainer Maria Rilke’s Duineser Elegien,
first published in 1923, though written between 1912 and 1922. Of the works under
consideration, this text adheres the most closely to the category of elegy; in addition to its
title, it borrows large-scale structure, meter, and tropes from the classical elegy.
However, Rilke complicates his elegy through his modernization of the form: he
secularizes it, thereby removing any kind of divine intercessor, and positions language as
the answer to human “fleetingness.” These changes in his ontological topography lead
him to reframe his concept of the Open and how humanity relates to its trajectory through
time.
In the second chapter, I will turn to Marcel Proust’s Du côté de chez Swann, first
published in 1913, the first volume of À la recherche du temps perdu (In Search of Lost
Time), which Proust began writing in 1908 and only finished with his death in 1922. This
text is the most obviously curious in its relation to elegy. Yet, as I will show, it will be
worth considering it in an elegiac light. Doing so highlights the overlap between
Bildungsroman and elegy as well as the tension between the time of the story—time as
produced through linguistic signification—and the time of referents—the time the
experience signified might occupy. Finally, Proust complicates concerns with human
movement through time by an awareness of the Open’s interrelation with embodiment.
In the third and final chapter, I will turn to Henri Michaux’s Misérable miracle,
first published in 1956. This text—the first in the cycle of Michaux’s five drug books,
begun in 1954 and not finished until the early 1970s, when he wrote an addendum for this

7

volume—again may seem ill-suited to elegy. However, it would be a mistake to situate it
otherwise. In addition to the typical genre-bending nature of Michaux’s work—his prose
poems become pseudo-ethnographies, his drawings become alphabets—I think it
essential to show that, at its core, Misérable miracle concerns itself with the same
problematics I will be discussing in the first two chapters, especially the possibility of
anagnorisis that is livable by a subject. For if Proust was concerned with the embodied
consciousness and therefore the way the subject was situated hermeneutically in relation
to history, Michaux seeks to press the issue by exploding consciousness through the
alteration of the body.

8

CHAPTER 1
RILKE

1.
In early 1903, Austro-Bohemian writer Rainer Maria Rilke began a
correspondence with Franz Xavier Kappus, a would-be poet who found himself, as Rilke
had been not too many years before, stuck in a military academy and wondering about his
future. The letters they wrote between then and 1908 were published in part after Rilke’s
death in 1926 and have since become famous under the title Briefe an einen jungen
Dichter (Letters to a Young Poet). In them, Mr. Kappus poses for the slightly older writer
a variety of questions about public life and career, and Rilke responds, not in kind, but by
transforming Mr. Kappus’ questions into an interrogation of how to face those questions.
In particular, Rilke addresses the misconception many people have about the progress of
their lives: he notes that “[i]t is only because so many people have not absorbed and
transformed their fates while they were living in them that they have not realized what
was emerging from them.”23 In other words, a life need not swerve, constantly taken by
surprise, shocked by the workings of the external world or by the churnings of the world
developing within a person; it only does so because of a person’s lack of awareness of his
or her situation and of him- or herself. Among the aspects of this fate that person has
failed to absorb, Rilke includes mortality (both in the letters and in Die Aufzeichnungen
des Malte Laurids Brigge (The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge), his own contribution
to the Bildungsroman). It is, therefore, not a surprise that he takes death, and particularly
young death, so hard. For a man centered so thoroughly on being self-made the violent
23

Letters, 86.
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exertion of that which lies beyond his control must be a shock. For him, the elegy must
also be a particularly important challenge.
In the Duineser Elegien, Rilke braces for that challenge, as he seeks to
transform—to absorb—death and make it his own. Begun in 1912 shortly before the
outbreak of World War I, the Elegien took ten years to complete and is thoroughly
inscribed with, if not the events of Rilke’s life, the turmoil of it during this period.
Indeed, it was not until the death of the nineteen-year-old dancer Wera Ockama Knoop
(to whom the Sonette an Orpheus (Sonnets from Orpheus), written shortly after the
Elegien, were dedicated) that he was motivated to finish the work; learning of her death
on New Year’s Day of 1922, he goes on to complete the Elegien in February of that
year.24
In the Elegien, he recalls and elaborates on a “vision” that he experiences in 1912
while staying at Princess Marie von Thurn und Taxis’ Duino Castle, where the position
of humanity in relation to time (figured as space, and projected into a topography25) is
explored. Through a series of comparisons of adult humans to angels, animals, children,
and puppets, Rilke considers human precariousness as subjects, their fleetingness, “that
we don’t feel very securely at home / within our interpreted world….”26 Furthermore,
Rilke seems to return to the drama that has been central to his subjecthood since the
Briefe, and which is the essential problem of Bildung and its failure: the paradox of a self
24

Cambridge Companion to Rilke, 22.
Nor was this particular version of displacement arbitrary. As Rosenthal points out in Mourning
Modernisms, “[b]y the late nineteenth century, what was once an end to be attained—the cartographic
saturation of the globe by empire, industry, technology—became a limit to be displaced and deferred. If, as
some have argued, the imperial project of territorial mapping induced a shift in the thinking and location of
utopia, a dislocation from space to time, modernism responded by co-opting the claims of perfectibility and
questioning the utopian extension of progress” (Rosenthal , 4-5).
25

26

Duino Elegies, 21.
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that both absorbs its fate and from which fate emerges, a self made by its surroundings,
its objects, on the one hand, and a self who builds through self-determination, on the
other. The human subject, caught for a brief moment in time, is it made of the world or of
itself?
In what follows, then, I would like to take my first step into elegy by looking at
the mapping of the subject in the Duineser Elegien as its skates along the limit between
inside and outside, negotiating Bildung’s failure. More particularly, I would like to
examine how Rilke constructs and deconstructs these spaces through the linguistic
binding of the “interpreted world.” In doing so, one can see how Rilke encapsulates his
task in itself: he fights death by driving language toward apotheosis and identifying
humans—poets really—as the only possible bearers of this god. After all, Rilke had to
write the Elegien, in which one sees him find the impetus for this elevation of language,
before he could realize that the only thing to do for Knoop was to dedicate the Sonette to
her, he had to write for himself the possibility of writing and of writing the world.

2.
In order to understand how Rilke configures subject and object within the
Elegien, it will be useful to start by mapping them in relation to the ideas of inside and
outside. For while “the Duineser Elegien corresponds surprisingly closely to the generic
norm of the classical German elegy,”27 it nonetheless “constitute[s] an anguished
testimony to the tragedy of the modern consciousness, which has alienated itself from the
security of wholeness and unity.”28 In other words, although maintaining—with slight

27
28

Ziolkowski, 251.
Ibid., 241
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alterations—the form of the elegy, Rilke nonetheless problematizes its assumptions,
especially the values adopted from Christian humanism, in order to repurpose the form
and make human frailty reconcilable without the Christian guarantees of God and the
afterlife. Or one might say, Rilke adapted the elegy in order to bring the elegiac structure
back into touch with the structure of modernity. After all, what use—and yes, I mean,
use—is an elegy that does not help its reader to exist within the framework, the ethos of
that reader’s world? While older elegies might have bearing on Rilke’s present—in
writing the Duineser Elegien, Rilke did in fact obsess over Hölderlin’s29—they could not
give him the answer that he desperately needed. As Walter Benjamin puts it in
“Unpacking My Library,” “[w]riters are really people who write books not because they
are poor but because they are dissatisfied with the books which they could buy but do not
like.”30 Rilke needed an elegy that could tell him how to deal with the shock of death in
his modern context, in a world that had thought futilely that, through scientific mastery, it
would escape death.
In the case of the Duineser Elegien, the work of mourning and reconciliation
occurs over a series of ten interlocking poems that act as the total surface for the work of
mourning. I say “the total surface” because, in the Elegien, Rilke is reverting to old
strategies. As Paul De Man, one of the most precise commentators on the poet, posits in
his Allegories of Reading (1979), Rilke is prone to using the central figure or figures of a
given poem in order to define the parameters of its world. By starting out with a broken
or incomplete version of the figure, Rilke can, over the course of a poem, make it whole
and thereby lead his reader through difficulty and into a space of positive transformation,

29
30

Cambridge Companion to Rilke, 17.
Benjamin, 61.
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what De Man calls “promise.” This form of activation falls under the rubric of
“chiasmus,” which “crosses the attributes of inside and outside and leads to the
annihilation” 31—or one might say, in slightly less absolute terms, the objectification—
“of the conscious subject.” 32 In other words, through chiasmus and its movement of the
subject into the position of the object, Rilke manages to create a space of reverberation
between subject and object through which is revealed the incompleteness of either the
subject or object perspective and the totality that only exists in their combination.
Not surprisingly, this model of making whole is ideal for the construction of the
elegiac—the movement of grieving and reconciliation, of anagnorisis—especially when
one opens up the meta-dimension that De Man finds essential to understanding Rilke’s
writing. De Man does not just posit the figure as a way of representing a transition from
negativity into positivity in the referent. Instead, he also asserts that this figuration is selfreflexive, that the figure consistently refers to language’s act of making in the world—i.e.
back to itself and its articulation of the shared subject-object threshold. The result is that
the world of the poem is, quite literally, the poem itself, and the figure “is not selected
because it corresponds analogically to the inner experience of a subject but because its
structure corresponds to that of a linguistic figure.”33 That is, the figure corresponds, not
to a consciousness, but to a set of relations working in the body of the text: the poem (its
syntax, its form) determines the appropriate figures of expression rather than the poet’s
subjectivity.
For De Man, it is this appeal—rhetorical, rather than a matter of good or bad
faith—to readers’ brokenness, their sense of powerlessness and alienation, that has made
31

De Man, 37
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
32
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Rilke’s work so popular. Readers mistake the figuration of the poetic voice for the
subjectivity of the poet and, in him, someone to whom they might relate. In the process,
however, they also miss what makes Rilke’s poetry both interesting and important,
namely, the language, the medium that allows this apparent transparence. It also suggests
what will become one of the primary concerns of this thesis: the submission of the author
to language. After all, the mistake of readers is to see in Rilke’s poetry another individual
for them to confront when, in fact, what they encounter is Rilke’s submission to language
and its circulation. This fact will become particularly clear later on this chapter, as the
Duineser Elegien offers one of the obvious statements of Rilke’s elevation of language.
Before getting into the Elegien, however, and in order to start investigating the
overdetermination of language risked as it oscillates between its role as tool and as
possessing force, it will be necessary to push De Man’s assertion of language’s primacy
in Rilke’s poetry one step further. De Man’s correspondences stop in relating the figure
to language in lieu of relating it to the subject. For my part, I will argue that, not only
does the figure correspond to language, but that the subject likewise corresponds to
language. Which is to say, the figure matches, not a consciousness expressing itself, but
the language that also creates consciousness’s thoughts. Thus only that which is already
caught up in language is or can be constituted as part of the system of figures. Or rather,
the system that one knows is constituted by language’s mesh.
Understanding this extra step will also be important to untangling the phrase “the
total surface” used above—because it is in taking this next step that Rilke connects the
language of the poem not just to itself, but also to the world beyond. For this reason, I
would like to turn to the work of Maurice Blanchot. Blanchot—who De Man criticized

14

for being too psychological and biographical in his approach to Rilke—wrote a series of
essays, collected in his 1943 Faux pas, bridging the discussions of language in relation to
the subject and also of interiority and exteriority. An examination of one of the essays in
particular, “How Is Literature Possible?” should help suss out the path forward across
“the total surface” of the Elegien.

3.
In his “How Is Literature Possible?” Blanchot discusses French writer, editor, and
critic Jean Paulhan’s Les Fleurs de Tarbes, ou la terreur dans les lettres (The Flowers of
Tarbes, or: Terror in Literature). In this treatise on rhetoric, Paulhan concerns himself,
according to Blanchot, with the ambiguity surrounding clichés, dividing writers up into
two camps based on their use of them. He begins with the “literary terrorists” who fear
“becom[ing] the victim of words, the soul of laziness and inertia, prey to ready-made
formulae.”34 They strive to release themselves from preconceived language and thought
through the absolute avoidance of cliché and convention. The second group, by contrast,
Paulhan identifies as the “rhetoricians,” who supposedly stick to tradition and the body of
rules that accompanies it. They are the group against whom the literary terrorists pit
themselves and, as the book progresses, come increasingly to resemble straw men. What
also becomes increasingly clear is that these two groups are nothing more than ways to
identify insurgencies against literary tradition. The so-called terrorists—which Paulhan
evokes as a reference to the dialectics of history, borrowed from Hegel and reintroduced
in France through the lectures of Kojève and the writings of Jean Hyppolite35—
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encompass a huge number of different, even conflicting, aesthetics; what they share are
their new bodies of negative rulings, of anti-rules, created in response to a sense of
reification in language and literature. These rules, however, according to Paulhan, only
establish a new set of verbal ticks. In other words, the terrorists cannot exit tradition
through its negation; they only reconstitute it. That which they so wanted to avoid
resurfaces in the form of new stutters.
This situation—rules and anti-rules—is not particularly interesting: inversion
rarely creates anything new, anything transformative, as it leaves intact the relationships
and dynamics of the initial situation (properly wielded chiasmus being a notable
exception).36 However, the question that the issue of literary terror triggers is worthy, as
Paulhan discovers, of exploration. This question is the title question of Blanchot’s
essay—how is literature possible?—and it is not as off-topic as it initially appears.
The argument goes something like this. If the rules and anti-rules of writing are
really not different from one another, then neither is the writing that makes use of them.
Surrealism, for example, which prided itself on escaping the literary entrapment of
romanticism and reaching into the public sphere, the politic beyond, in reality only
created more art: André Breton’s revolution never happened. Thus, says Blanchot,
the concept that we have just learned to know under the name of Terror is not any
aesthetic or critical concept whatsoever; […] it is literature, or at least its soul.
The result of this is that when we call Terror into question in order to refute it or
to show the consequences of its logic, it is literature itself that we question and
drive toward nothingness.37
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In drawing into question counter-formalist rules, one does not in fact arrive at an
interrogation of those who would seek to break down the foundations of literature.
Rather, one finds oneself interrogating those very foundations, asking how literature—
any literature—works. And that question can be much more easily answered than can any
question about adherence to specific literary schools, any ars poetica. After all,
“literature exists.”38 Like technology, it proves itself in that it works. One does not need
to know how, only that it does.
Blanchot’s belief in literature’s existence proving itself brings one to another
juncture where he begins to diverge from De Man. Whereas De Man is satisfied with
Rilke’s poetry being a reflexive poetic act, Blanchot sees language, even when it is the
driving force, as being bound up with the world of the subject’s interiority, as well—
though not because that interiority creates anything. Rather, because it works the other
way around. Indeed, through his reading of Paulhan, Blanchot turns inner experience
completely inside out. As he puts it,
One might say [Paulhan’s] Copernican revolution consists of causing language no
longer to revolve around thought but rather to imagine another very subtle and
complex mechanism in which thought, in order to rediscover its authentic nature,
revolves around language.39
The interior of thought, consciousness, is actually dependent on the stratification of
existence according to language, the tissue of the exterior—and Blanchot goes on to
clarify what exactly this “complex mechanism” is by turning to translation.
In considering the activity of translation, it would be easy to make the mistake of
imagining translation as a matter of matching the words of two languages, so that the
38
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target language seems to mirror the source language. However, as Blanchot shows, there
is more to translation than a mere one-to-one correspondence—what one might call
reflection—of words across languages. Blanchot turns his attention to an essay on
translation that Paulhan initially wrote for, but then excluded from, Les Fleurs de Tarbes.
In it, Paulhan “notes that a suitable study of translation would reveal a method to reach
authentic thought.”40 In other words, a complete study of translation would not only trace
back from the translation of a text to the original text, but also from the original text to
the original thought. Blanchot then goes on to say that
[t]he immediate thought (the one that consciousness has seen for us with a gaze
that dissected it) is deprived of what can be called its stereotypes, its premises, its
cadence. It is false and arbitrary, impure and conventional. We recognize only our
own gaze in it. On the other hand, if we submit it to the rules of rhetoric, if we
surprise attention through rhythm, rhyme, and the order of number, we can hope
to see the mind returned to its stereotypes and its premises, united once again with
the soul from which it had separated. Thought will come back pure, a virgin and
innocent contact, not at all apart from words but in the intimacy of speech,
through the use of clichés, which alone are able to rescue it from the
anamorphoses of reflection.41
In speaking a thought, in returning it to language and to language’s clichés developed in
social space, that thought is forced into the realm of possibility that language holds, is
forced into the realm beyond the small experience of the individual, and is made sensitive
to the linguistically ordered world. It is surprised by the regulatory exterior of language
that best opens onto the possibilities of thought. Otherwise, a thought can only construe
itself through the finite net of one’s own experience, one’s own subjectivity, one’s own
gaze—the result of which, is not the new, not the open, not the outside, but instead only
the trap of reflection, the mise-en-abyme. Thus, in lieu of affirming the inwardness of
40
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inner experience, Blanchot, via Paulhan, affirms the outwardness of the experience
construed through language. Subjectivity, as the product of language, secures its claim to
a place on the surface.
And thus one returns to the “total surface” of the Elegien on which the work of
mourning takes place in the poem. The total surface of the Elegien, as can now be
gathered, is constituted through the text itself—the artifice of language that creates the
realm of possibilities in its articulation of thought, the techniques of outwardness. The
working through of mourning and of reconciliation with death all takes place within this
body of text and the responses it generates. Thus, the outwardness borrowed—in this case
by Rilke—comes from a variety of places: the German language, including the syntax
from which, according to De Man, Rilke builds most of the figures of his poems; the
literary, historical, and religious traditions to which Rilke frequently alludes; the
philosophical assertion and contestation of Bildung that underpins the Elegien; and the
poetic forms Rilke borrows, such as, in the case of my focus here, the elegy. Thus, the
‘total surface’ also refers to Rilke’s project of totalizing figuration. But what then is the
figure of the Duineser Elegien? What does Rilke use in his attempt to confront mortality?

4.
There are a number of recurrent figures over the course of the ten poems (and
approximately thirty pages) comprising the Elegien—that is the hazard of expanding the
technique Rilke developed in earlier works, like the short lyrics of the Neue Gedichte
(New Poems), into a sustained sequence. However, while several of these figures play an
important role in creating localized totalities within individual poems or across one or
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two, the only figure—and here I use this term to refer to the symbol which also functions
through chiasmus, through, and the word is appropriate here in all its extremity,
“annihilation” enacted through rhetoric—that really strives to encapsulate the total
expanse of all ten poems is that of the Angel. Mentioned in the first few lines of the first
elegy and returned to repeatedly over the course of the poems, the Angel acts as Rilke’s
unifying structure. Made available to Rilke by the Christian humanist tradition out of
which (and against which) he writes, in Rilke’s conception, the Angel has a particular
perspective on that which is at stake in mourning death, namely, time. 42 After all, death is
the temporal limit, the most obvious and universal limit, on humanity. Humans die. There
is no way around that.
Unless, of course, you are outside of time, with its passage meaning little or
nothing to you. Angels seem to have this advantage: they
wüßten oft nicht, ob sie unter
Lebenden gehn oder Toten. Die ewige Strömung
reißt durch beide Bereiche alle Alter
immer mit sich und übertönt sie in beiden.43
are often unable to tell
whether they move among living or dead. The eternal
torrent whirls all the ages through either realm
for ever, and sounds above their voices in both.44
In other words, unlike “the living / [who] make the mistake of drawing too sharp
distinctions,”45 the Angel does not separate out those who have reached the end of their
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passage through time from those who are still in its bowels. Instead, the Angel sees “the
eternal / torrent” encompassing everyone. Time is a factor of human perception, not,
according to Rilke, Angelic perception. Furthermore, there is the matter of this last line:
the torrent, in addition to whirling, “sounds above their voices in both.” I think it safe to
understand “both” (“beide”) to pertain here to the two realms, one of the living and one
of dead, in which humans speak. The idea of voice is important, as I will explain in more
detail in a moment, because it is through the voice that humans, on the one hand, mourn
and “wail” (the primary word Rilke uses to describe mourning) and, on the other, it is the
avenue through which humans reveal language. The whirlwind in which the Angels see
all humanity caught is indifferent to the sounds of either, as are, thus, the Angels. And
here one arrives at the downside of this broad perspective. The anguish of humans at
death makes no sense to angels. An appeal to them is incomprehensible. The Angels’
inhuman perspective makes them blind to human suffering.
Thus, over the course of the first elegy, the gesture of Rilke’s figure begins to
reveal itself. The Angel unites time, on the one hand, and reveals the indifferent cruelty
of such a unity, on the other. This fact underlines the disruption of the possibility of
Bildung, of education within culture and therefore within history. After all, the Angel in
the whirlwind is an image popularized in the eighteenth century, where it pops up in
works by Joseph Addison and Alexander Pope and in a letter between John Page and
Thomas Jefferson.46 (It is also familiar to contemporary ears because of its use and abuse
by George W. Bush as he sought to capitalize on a revival of US messianism). However,
in each of those iterations, the Angel is interfering in human affairs—in the development
of history. It directs the storm and lends to history a drive, inevitability, a destiny. Rilke’s
46
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Angel, by contrast, does not even perceive the storm, let alone concern itself with human
tribulation. If anything, Rilke’s Angel is more in line with the famous “Angel of History”
from Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History.”47 And yet, Benjamin’s Angel
maintains a relation to history—the difference there from the eighteenth-century models
is that it lacks control, as does humanity. Rilke’s vision is far more brutal. It removes the
relevance of the Angel, and of the divine, by making the Angel indifferent altogether.
Rilke’s vision of the elegiac challenge is thus, despite its formal proximity to the classical
elegy, a rather extreme departure from the tradition.
The question, then, to which Rilke must pursue an answer, is how humans are
able to handle the indifference of their possible intercessors. How can they get a handle
on the grief that the Angel cares nothing for? And, as the last line of the stanza quoted
above suggests, it has something to do with voice—not as it relates to wailing (wailing is
a form of grieving but contains no possibility of reconciliation or reformulation), but as it
relates to language. For language, poeticized by Rilke as voice, seems to offer something
like a human parallel to that which the Angel offers to the structure and possibilities of
the poem: it brings together the living and the dead under the auspices of both.
Furthermore, it suggests continuity between theses two phases of human life which
otherwise seem completely out of step.

5.
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Language, like human being, faces time as a limitation. After all, it unfolds across
time and must be processed through time. Language, however, has one advantage over
humans, namely, that it endures. Indeed, even as it changes, it continues to exist as
artifact and as a tracery image of that which exists—and changes and decays and dies—in
time. In other words, language—language’s body—finds itself in a somewhat paradoxical
position. It both experiences time and transcends it. It both participates in and builds
history. It suffers decay and development, and yet remains unchanged.
It is for this reason that, in the Duineser Elegien, when Rilke makes claims about
the purpose of humans, whom he idealizes as poets, he assigns them the task of
transforming the world into words:
Bringt doch der Wanderer auch vom Hange des Bergrands
nicht eine Hand voll Erde ins Tal, die allen unsägliche, sondern,
ein erworbenes Wort, reines, den gelben und blaun
Enzian. Sind wir vielleicht h i e r, um zu sagen....48
For the wanderer doesn’t bring from the mountain slope
a handful of earth to the valley, untellable earth, but only
some word he has won, a pure word, the yellow and blue
gentian. Are we, perhaps, here just for saying….49
In these lines, Rilke describes a wanderer descending to humanity, from mountain to
valley, bringing something with him. This moment is odd within the Elegien for a
number of reasons. For one thing, there is the matter of its chronology. Neither the
landscape nor the mountain range has yet been identified at this point in the ninth elegy.
Instead, this passage points forward, telescoping into the allegory of the Laments, which
dominates the tenth and final elegy and which ends with the youth standing with the elder
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Lament at the foot of “the mountains of Primal Pain”50 that the youth must, and does,
climb. Thus, while it is in the ninth elegy that the youth (the wanderer, the human, the
poet) returns from the mountain slope, it is not until the tenth elegy that this same youth
begin his climb up it.
The question of chronology becomes both recurrent and absent in the Elegien. On
the one hand, chronology has been invalidated by the totality constructed via the figure of
the Angel in the first elegy—history has no place here because the Angel cannot
recognize it, so neither does succession. On the other hand, this flattening of time and
space’s substitution for time mean that the moments in which time does function
sequentially stand out. Thus, another oddity of these four lines is the ambiguity of the
mountain slope. After all, while one reads of the wanderer’s descent and of the youth’s
ascent, at no point does Rilke describe what happens on the mountaintop itself. The
implication of sequence and its inversion draws the reader’s attention to what is not
described, to the step left out. Indeed, these circumstances create the only event in the
Elegien that stands out clearly as an event, one that its non-telling delimits as a moment
of actual change.
Traditionally, when a wanderer scales a mountain, he encounters the divine. Take,
for example, Petrarch or Augustine, Moses or Dante. Even the modern counterparts of
these wanderers stage their revelations about the failure of revelation in the mountains—
the wanderer/madman of Nietzsche’s Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (The Gay Science)
being the most relevant. The mountaintop—the pinnacle, the point of triumph over the
ordeal of the climb—is thus supposed to be the sight of revelation, of vision, a stage for
the event’s occurrence. And so it is for Rilke, according to the structure both in the poem
50
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and external to it. Not only did he begin writing the Duineser Elegien following his own
Alpine vision, but it is also on a mountaintop that the young poet that Rilke describes
experiences his own revelation. Of course, neither Rilke’s revelation nor that of his poet
has anything to do with the divine. That avenue of possibility has already been foreclosed
through the indifference of the Angel. Instead, the mountain of Rilke’s revelation, though
not connecting humans to the heavens, still returns them to the earth of which the
mountain is made. Therein rests the heart of the Elegien, the insight into language as a
tool that pivots Rilke into the space of anagnorisis.
Stones and rocks become symbols for Rilke’s contemporaries and literary
descendants. In poems by César Vallejo and Wislaw Szymborska51—just to name a
few—stones become a way to reconsider things as things. In these lines of Rilke’s, where
it is the earth that becomes that which language cannot appropriate, one begins to see a
foreshadowing of this tradition. Indeed, perhaps it could even be said to be traceable back
to Rilke, whose own thing-poems, his Dingegedicht, originated in the period of his
secretarial work for the sculptor Rodin in the 1910s.52 Either way, rocks, stones, and the
earth act as roadblocks to language, and it is their presence here that creates one of the
most interesting problems for the Elegien. Anagnorisis, the goal of elegy, does not, one
must remember, come easily. It can only result from the working through of shock—i.e.
through the overcoming of an obstacle, an ordeal. The question for the reader, however,
is, what is the ordeal in the Duineser Elegien? Was the mountain climb the ordeal, or was
the mining of this ordeal for language the ordeal? Or, to put it another way, all of a
sudden, there appear to be two struggles that Rilke is addressing in the Elegien, and it is
I am thinking of Vallejo’s “Piedra negra sobre una piedra blanca” and Szymborska’s “Conversation
with a Stone.”
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unclear which ordeal culminates in the anagnorisis necessary to the elegiac genre. First,
there is the struggle of mourning and reconciliation with death, i.e. there is the struggle of
and with shock, with traumatic experience. This ordeal seems to manifest in the Elegien
in the representation of the mountain climbing, the existential heave-ho. However, the
second ordeal appears to concern, not the climbing of the mountain, but what happens
once the climbing has stopped. It concerns itself with the performance of representation.
In other words, the second ordeal asks, how does one wrest language from experience?
In many ways, this question rests at the heart of my inquiry, not only in this
chapter but also in this thesis in general. Not because of what it asks exactly, but because
it points to the process being investigated: preparation for limit-experience, for the shock
of limit-experience, for awareness of one’s limits, for and of the elegy. For, if the struggle
of the elegy in the twentieth century is to renegotiate the human relationship with death
after Bildung’s failure, to make anagnorisis work despite progress’s hopelessness and the
absence of the divine, it can only do so by retelling the narrative of humanity’s passage
through time without guarantees. For Rilke, this need means that the elegy must return
the reader to a fixation on the role of language. After all, language, as the engine of the
processing of experience, does not just beckon the subject into the realm of the social,
into history. It also, à la Blanchot and Paulhan, produces the subject and, I would argue,
the time of the subject, which is history. Thus, humans are, as Rilke says in the saddest of
the elegies, the fourth elegy:

Wir sind nicht einig. Sind nicht wie die Zugvögel verständigt. Überholt und spät,
so drängen wir uns plötzlich Winden auf
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und fallen ein auf teilnahmslosen Teich.
Blühn und verdorrn ist uns zugleich bewußt.53
We’re never single-minded, unperplexed,
like migratory birds. Outstript and late,
we suddenly thrust into the wind, and fall
into unfeeling ponds. We comprehend
flowering and fading simultaneously.54
Humans are overly weighed down by a sense of being too late, too far behind the current
of events. They only know what they need to know to act after the present has already
been converted into past action, after they are already überholt, antiquated. They see a
determined, if not purposeful, rush into the future, and this pressure has its consequence:
the flaw of the deadline. They find themselves unable to create, unable to sustain the
present, the opposite of history, as a result. It forces them to feel their impending demise
and occludes the Open in which things are possible. Language embeds humanity into a
timeline—of progress, of Bildung—that in turn braces them against a future that entraps.
Every possibility already senses its closure, its “fading,” its death.
At the same time, however, Rilke discovers and argues for the fact that it is
language that allows humanity to mourn the loss of this Open and to return to it anew.
After all, the present is just a tense through which humans carve out action, change,
difference. For while, as Henri Bergson says in Matière et mémoire (Matter and
Memory), “[t]here is for us nothing that is instantaneous,”55 one can still, through
language, give the impression of instantaneity and of the protracted instantaneity of the
static moment, the limitless moment. Paradoxically, this same maker of history is also
that which allows humans to outlast any given moment—their given moments—in
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history. Thus, in the eighth elegy, the extreme joy of which counterbalances the fourth
elegy, the flower that had been cursed to only bloom in light of fading is not pressured by
that demise at the hands of the outside world:
Wir haben nie, nicht einen einzigen Tag,
den reinen Raum vor uns, in den die Blumen
unendlich aufgehn. Immer ist es Welt
und niemals Nirgends ohne Nicht:
das Reine, Unüberwachte, das man atmet und
unendlich w e i ß und nicht begehrt.56
We’ve never, no, not for a single day,
pure space before us, such as that which flowers
endlessly open into: always world,
and never nowhere without no: that pure,
unsuperintended element one breathes,
endlessly knows, and never craves.57
The negative possession of “wir haben nie, nicht einen einzigen Tag” launches Rilke into
some of the most poignant, if abstract, lines of the Elegien. In them, he uses an almost
apophatic strategy: he invokes through negation and through the admission of the
impossibility of the thing except as it exists as a negation of the possible, i.e. as a virtual
thing. Thus, “nowhere” only exists as an alternative to some “where”—the non-place, the
utopic place. And of course, likewise, and keeping in mind that Rilke has consistently
mapped the trajectories of time onto topography, this nowhere is also a no-when: the nonexistent moment of the expansive present.
Language thus both creates and alleviates the pressure of human mortality, the
weight against which the elegy strives. Through it, Rilke can break the desire behind
grieving. He can write of the world presenced, not unfolded, which is available otherwise
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only to the unhailed, those not implicated, at least not yet, in history (for Rilke, children,
animals, and his Angel). Rilke trades in, not only the Interior for the Outside, but also the
Outside for the Open, where what is possible is.
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CHAPTER 2
PROUST

1.
If Rilke’s Duineser Elegien recounts the vision through which he realized the
need to, in the face of human fleetingness, reach through death into the Open of
possibilities via language, Marcel Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu enacts another
alternative, as he watches a boy—also named Marcel—grow into an artist. Sharing
qualities with the Bildungsroman and the Künstlerroman, and prefiguring autofiction, À
la recherche du temps perdu nonetheless operates in the mode of elegy. After all,
growing up, as figured by Proust, involves two things: an “apprenticeship” to art, to use a
term borrowed from Gilles Deleuze’s Proust et Signes (Proust & Signs), and the
development of an understanding of the boundaries of the self. Although this model of
limitations most obviously echoes the Bildungsroman’s trajectory through various modes
of living58, it also underscores the most obvious human limitations, time and death.
Time is, as one can tell from the title of the complete work, the focal point of
Proust’s project. However, Proust does not concern himself with utopic time as Rilke
does. Instead, he uses memory and art—writing, the very book one reads—as methods
for finding, in the face of time’s persistent passing, time regained (the title of the last of
the seven volumes). This time offers him something resembling the anagnorisis by which
the elegy culminates. Indeed, it gives the narrator Marcel a sense of joy, continuity, and
expansion as Proust plays off of what Walter Benjamin describes in “The Image of
58
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Proust” as “convoluted time”59 or what might be considered, in light of the last chapter
and Rilke’s techniques of figuration, a sense of the thing made whole. For while these
temporary joys may be represented in the sensuous encounters described in Marcel’s
story, the implication is that the lasting joy is somewhere else: the text itself. The
Recherche should never be claimed as simply autobiographical, but there is still the
suggestion that the person being “built,” the individual undergoing Bildung and coming
into being is, more or less, the author, Proust. The result is a text that demonstrates its
aesthetics by reshaping life into art, in its creation of a temporal whole from fragmented
experience.
In this chapter, I will focus only on the first volume of the Recherche, that is, Du
côté de chez Swann, published in 1913, in which Proust starts out his exploration of “the
sensuous signs of involuntary memory,” which “represent […] the effort of life to prepare
us for art and for the final revelation of art.”60 Although the full impact of the elegiac
cannot yet be felt in this volume of the Recherche—while Proust’s parents died only
shortly before he moved into the apartment in which he would write the bulk of the
Recherche61, his sometimes lover Agostinelli did not die until 191462, after the first
publication of Du côté de chez Swann—it lingers there nonetheless and dramatically
impacts both how Proust approaches the transcending of human limitation and the
generic model of the Bildungsroman. Proust consistently focuses on individuals who face
59
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shortcomings, either as a result of psychology or of social station, and there is no hero, no
one of grand stature in the Recherche. Instead, the Bildungsroman—which began “as a
comforting genre” 63 in which “the traditional plot of the coming-of-age novel humanizes
the notion of progress by endowing time with a completely productive function”64—
circles in on itself and explores the possibility of the timeline that becomes infinite only
within the confines of a life adapted into a textual body. Where Rilke found a door in the
elegiac word allowing him to go on, Proust found a dwelling wherein the elegy climaxed
in the joy of time regained.

2.
As with the previous chapter, consideration of genre will help to inscribe some
boundaries useful for entering Proust’s work. Most broadly the Recherche is a novel,
detailing the semi-fictional life of its main character, Marcel, and more particularly it
should be lumped into the category of the Bildungsroman—though, as I have already
stipulated, a Bildungsroman toying with the elegiac operations to which Bildung also
lends itself. The term Bildungsroman derives from “lectures by the early nineteenthcentury critic Karl Morgenstern.” 65 According to him, the term describes a two-fold
project: first, it depicts the protagonist’s (or in the Bildungsroman’s nascent stages, the
hero’s) Bildung, and, second, “by means of this depiction, it promotes the Bildung of the
reader to a greater extent than any other type of novel.” 66 In other words, the novel of
Bildung is a story of the education and development of both its protagonist and, through

63

Bell, 40.
Ibid.
65
Cambridge Companion to the Modern German Novel, 77-8.
66
Ibid.
64

32

example, its reader. It dates more or less to the eighteenth century when, in the ethos of
the Enlightenment, educational theories were a primary focus and literature and the social
sciences were closely intertwined. 67 Of course, this means that the Bildungsroman runs
into many of the same problems that the simultaneously developing educational theory
ran into, and which has already been discussed in relationship to elegy. Both of them
suffered from the centripetal force of cultural normativity—i.e. an education toward the
norm—with desired traits and practices reinforcing prior classism, racism, sexism,
nationalism, and imperialism. Furthermore, these trajectories of education were aligned
with trajectories of personhood—wherein personhood is recognition of those visible to
the law as citizens. The Bildungsroman thus became, not a novel about the education of a
subject (whatever that might mean), but rather the novel of the education of a certain kind
of subject, most often white, male, and wealthy, or at least, white, male, and productive
according to capitalist designations. The story of the development of the individual also
became that of the development of the nation.
The developments of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were therefore
sure to have an impact on the conception of the Bildungsroman. What began as a
question of “how […] the increasingly autonomous, free self [might be] reconciled to a
self concerned with, and constrained by, the greater social good“68 transformed into a
matter of how the individual self might be squeezed into the mechanical life that
undergirded the goal of productivity. In the case of narrative, this increasingly
paradoxical time, both increasingly regulated and increasingly unassimilable, forced
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“[t]he replacement of the older narration by information, of information by sensation.”69
In other words, segments of experience replaced continuity and narrative, and the image
created by these segments of experience became both too big and too complex to grasp. It
also became a social fabric from which it was very hard to constitute a person who felt
any sense of coherency.
Bearing these difficulties in mind, I would like to return, then, to the elegy. As
was discussed above, elegy charts the process of mourning, of transforming grief into
reconciliation. It culminates in anagnorisis, that is, a moment of revelation which, while
pertinent to other genres, figures most prominently in the elegy. It is thus no casual
remark when critic Theodore Ziolkowski suggests that the elegy is the “poetic
counterpart of the Bildungsroman”70—or, more properly given the history of the two
genres, that the Bildungsroman is the novel form of the elegy:
For Bildung, in contrast to the erudition prized by earlier generations, implies an
ideal of personal cultivation and learning for its own sake. Knowledge and
‘culture’ are valued only to the extent that they contribute to the personal
development of the individual. It is this task that the classical German elegy was
ideally suited to fulfill since its very structure was conceived in order to
demonstrate the anagnorisis achieved by the individual through meditation on
problems of culture.71
Structurally—in terms of both their sequencing over time and their goals—elegy and
Bildungsroman resemble one another. They both strive to join the individual to the world
in which he or she lives and which binds him or her, and they are both invested in
describing the process of doing so, in order to bring the reader along for the protagonist’s
transformation. They do, however, emphasize slightly different dynamics in this process.
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The Bildungsroman, as has been described above, is meant to educate, to create through
the reflection of the protagonist in the reader a pattern for becoming a subject. The elegy,
on the other hand, is not so much about creating a person who fits society’s norms, as it is
about accompanying a reader through the mismatch between limitations and the subject.
In other words, the elegy charts an individual’s confrontation with his or her limits,
especially death, while a Bildungrsoman suggests ways to avoid such a confrontation
through conformity and acceptance.
In light of industrialization, the World Wars, and the accompanying questioning
of progress, however, the Bildungsroman becomes dysfunctional, and the elegy takes
over the Bildungsroman, possesses it. Elegy is a genre ready to swallow shock, rupture—
it has been designed specifically to swallow shock and rupture. It is supposed to tame the
impact of death, to force its disruption into the continuity that the eighteenth century’s
sensibility of progress assumes undergirds the history of which the individual is striving
to become a part. The elegy thus has less distance to travel, fewer changes to make than
the Bildungsroman, when it comes to being ready for the challenge of modern
experience.

3.
In the case of the Recherche, and Du côté de chez Swann in particular, the
possession of the Bildungsroman by the elegy takes place in specific ways. Du côté de
chez Swann is composed of three parts: “Combray” (1 and 2), “Swann in Love,” and
“Place-Names: The Name.” In what follows, I shall focus on the first and last of these
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sections.72 In “Combray,” Proust narrates, slowly, at a pace even slower than real-time,
his protagonist Marcel’s disorientation upon waking up from sleep and the memories of
other wakings in other places that his mind releases into the vacuum formed by those first
ambiguous moments. In particular, he follows through a series of memories that focus on
and around his grandparents’ house in Combray, where he would spend his summers. In
“Place-Names: The Name,” Proust’s sleepy and sleepless peregrinations return to
Combray but in the context of a larger world of possibilities summoned to him, not only
by the sensations of the past and the names of places he has already been, but also by the
imploring nature of names connected to the not-yet-experienced. In both cases, sleep
stands as the ground of the Recherche, the ground from which it emerges, is raised. It
serves as the dark vastness through which the traveler (Marcel) moves and encounters the
figments of the past and the possible futures.
In the structuring of the plot and the system of signs that generate it, one can track
the traditional form of the Bildungsroman. Most simply, Marcel grows up, and, along the
way, he learns to interpret the sensible world and the world of society. Just as much, he is
introduced to art and develops an artistic sensibility, which eventually produces the story
one is reading. Indeed, beginning with his grandmother, who “could never resign herself
to buying anything from which one could not derive an intellectual profit, and especially
that which beautiful things afford us by teaching us to seek our pleasure elsewhere than
in the satisfactions of material comfort and vanity,”73 and continuing with his friend
Bloch and the reticent art engagement of Charles Swann, the protagonist develops a love
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of literature that inclines his uncle to go so far as to dub him a young Victor Hugo (a fact
which he leverages into his first encounter with a dodgy courtesan).74 What is more, Du
côté de chez Swann culminates, from the vantage of the reader and the narrator rather
than that of the protagonist—or one might say, from the vantage of the artist consumed
with the shape of the whole, rather than localized, text—with the inclusion of the young
narrator’s description of his experience of the steeples at Martinville. In other words, one
reads in this first volume why Marcel decides to become—and how he begins to
become—a writer.
This experience of the steeples does not, however, correspond to anagnorisis in
the same way that Rilke’s culminating ascent to the mountaintop did. Instead, it is one of
many small instances of anagnorisis, of reconciliation with life—and death. De Man, as
one saw in the last chapter, posits that Rilke uses totalizing figures, on the one hand, to
rig the gesture of making-whole into the constitution of the poem, and, on the other hand,
to guarantee that the signifiers in the poem always point back at themselves and away
from the potential referents. The result is that, even in the face of human limitation—
human termination—the language of the poem offers the poet a way out: while language
brings humans into history and makes them aware of their own passing and its
immanence, it also gives them the capacity to conceptualize their limitations and keep
living despite them.
In Du côté de chez Swann, by contrast, the question of the whole is decidedly
more complicated. From the perspective of construction, it and the final volume, Le
Temps retrouvé (Time Regained), are the only volumes in the whole of the Recherche
that Proust conceived of as a unit. He wrote the Recherche “between January 1908, when
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[he] began to jot down ideas for a new fictional project, and November 1922, when –
already terminally ill – he envisaged a highly controversial reorganisation of the novel’s
penultimate volume, Albertine disparue.”75 However, the work as a whole did not evolve
in a linear fashion. Rather,
[h]is creative approach was essentially thematic: he worked around an idea,
character, or place, giving little attention to chronology and plot; only at a later
stage, when he had a clearer vision of his project, did he assemble hitherto
disparate fragments into a more coherent sequence by means of a sophisticated
‘cut and paste’ technique not dissimilar to the ‘montage’ used by modern film
makers.76
In other words, Proust did not set out with a particular story in mind—that he found
later—but instead sought to extend his novel via the gradual exploration of certain
characters (person or place) and certain problems (such as voluntary and involuntary
memory, the sensible and names). In this fashion, he developed first Du côté de chez
Swann and Temps retrouvé and subsequently the intervening five volumes, the last of
those on his deathbed when he re-wrote the part of Albertine.77 Nonetheless, because of
this framing, while a lot can happen to change an author and his formulation of his work
over the course of fourteen years, Du côté de chez Swann changed little, only differing
slightly from the original 1913 edition when it was re-issued in 1919.
The takeaway here is that the structure of Du côté de chez Swann is not a matter
of closed circuitry that could be set up to aid in the creation of a reconciliatory moment. It
is not designed to lead into the single, cumulative moment of anagnorisis—the moment
when Rilke realizes that the poet may not be able to sustain the weight of the perishable
75 The Cambridge Companion to Proust, 52.
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earth but that he can harness language in order to document it. There are, so to speak, too
many moving pieces in Du côté de chez Swann—and in the Recherche as a whole—for
that to work. That said, Proust methodically uses the structure of memory in order to
navigate the elusiveness of wholeness. Instead of creating a large-scale structure to
destabilize and force completion, he can thus create pockets of wholeness. In other words,
while neither the life nor the Bildung of Marcel can be delimited as a whole entity—after
all, “none of us constitutes a material whole, identical for everyone”78—a moment in that
life can be. It can be complete in that it has passed—or rather, it can be completed once it
has passed. For just as the boundaries of the text allow it to include the infinite, so, too,
do the boundaries of a moment allow it to be expanded. Thus, for Proust, real time past
can bear a resemblance to Rilke’s utopic time. To explain, let me turn then to the central
problem of the Recherche, and that which underlines its elegiac quality, namely,
limitations.

4.
If Proust finds in Du côté de chez Swann pockets of completeness, he must do so,
however, through the repetition of incompleteness—localized, as already mentioned, but
also conceived, not rhetorically, but experientially. Thus, Proust negotiates his
protagonist Marcel’s relationship with the external world through a series of encounters
in which Marcel feels his place in the world, his bounds, and his sense of control over
himself threatened. None of these moments take on the dramatic nature of real violence—
Proust does not force his characters to suffer through substantial trauma. However, in the
case of the first and third parts of Du côté de chez Swann, he does endure social and
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metaphysical anxiety at the hands of his surroundings. Take for example, the lamp that
appears early on in “Combray.” When Marcel is a small boy, he suffers great anxiety at
being isolated from his family. Indeed, much of the first part of “Combray” depicts the
drama of the goodnight kiss from his mother he must forgo when his parents have
company. In addition to this after dinner drama, however, there are the hours Marcel
dreads spending alone just before dinner. In an attempt to assuage his fear, his mother
and grandmother get him a lamp projecting the story of Golo into his room. These good
intentions, however, actually make worse Marcel’s anxieties:
Mais ma tristesse n’en était qu’accrue, parce que rien que le changement
d’éclairage détruisait l’habitude que j’avais de ma chambre et grâce à quoi, sauf
le supplice du coucher, elle m’était devenue supportable. Maintenant je ne la
reconnaissais plus et j’y étais inquiet, comme dans une chambre d’hôtel ou de
<<chalet>>, où je fusse arrivé pour la première fois en descendant de chemin de
fer.79
But my sadness was only increased by this since the mere change in lighting
destroyed the familiarity which my bedroom had acquired for me and which,
except for the torment of going to bed, had made it tolerable to me. Now I no
longer recognized it and I was uneasy there, as in a room in some hotel or
“chalet” to which I had come for the first time straight from the railway train.80
The distraction, the pseudo-company of the story in light, does not protect Marcel from
his solitude. It does nothing to offer him connection or warmth. Instead, it has the effect
of possessing the room, much like the elegy possesses the Bildungsroman in Proust’s
attempted story of growing up. It makes the room unfamiliar. It turns it into a place as
strange as any unknown way station. In effect, Marcel is haunted by history—especially
given that the story Golo is a part is of the Merovingian history of France, best known for
Clovis I, often identified as the founder of the nation. The founding figures of France
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enter into Proust’s Bildungsroman as ghosts, as the prolonged dead, as those who never
found any kind of reconciliation with mortality.
Or at least, Golo appears that way to Marcel, who has yet to recognize the other
half of language’s role. After all, while he is beckoned into history’s rapid progression
through the lamp’s storytelling (which is simultaneously art and, through the memories of
the stories Marcel has heard, language), he is prevented from participating in the making
of the story—it is no accident that this encounter is with projections. They threaten him
with not only the unheimlich, but also with metaphysical erasure and the power of the
aesthetic:
je ne peux dire quel malaise me causait pourtant cette intrusion du mystère et de
la beauté dans une chambre que j’avais fini par remplir de mon moi au point de
ne pas faire plus attention à elle qu’à lui-même. L’influence anesthésiante de
l’habitude ayant cessé, je me mettais à penser, à sentir, choses si tristes.81
I cannot express the uneasiness caused in me by this intrusion of mystery and
beauty into a room I had at last filled with myself to the point of paying no more
attention to the room than to that self. The anesthetizing influence of habit having
ceased, I would begin to have thoughts, and feelings, and they are such sad
things.82
Marcel finds himself, on the one hand, thrust into history and, on the other hand, removed
from his quotidian manner of insertion into that history and left without the
“anesthetizing influence of habit.” He is outside the social group, but he is not allowed to
remain coiled in the space that he has constructed by his own conventions. He has been
left with “thoughts and feelings,” even fear, at losing the “room I had at last filled with
myself” to “this intrusion of mystery and beauty”—that is, his own language, his personal
language, has suddenly been flattened by the looming communal language in which he
81
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does not yet participate and with which he has not yet figured out how to coexist. Proust
thus captures the moment when “while a child’s quite small we take it / and turn it round
and force it to look backwards at conformation, not that openness”83 that Rilke describes
just before his assertion of utopic space and time in the Elegien. There is not yet any
relief here in art for Marcel, only pain.

5.
Proust’s Marcel does, however, move beyond that pain: that is the point of the
text, the cause for the possession by the elegiac. However, he does so by returning to the
question that I posed with regards to Rilke in the first chapter: how does one wrest
language from experience? Or, how does one make of earth—rocks, bodies, feelings—
language?
Since initially posing that question, I have progressed further in the discussion of
the relationship between language, history, and Bildung. Elegy—like the better-known
Bildungsroman—takes up as its task the modeling of the subject’s fabrication from the
social. As such, it concerns itself with the double-ordeal of mourning: reconciliation with
loss, on the one hand, and articulation of that loss, on the other. In other words, it
addresses the paradox of language as that which constitutes thinking. Language is both
that which makes one aware of futurity and thus one’s finiteness as well as that which
extends one beyond one’s limits by allowing one to partake of the social experience and
its continuity. We are called into history by the need to borrow language, and we give to
history, contribute to history through language.
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As a result of this dynamic, humans become the conduit of language. This allows
a restatement of the question posed with regards to Rilke above: how can humans enter
history? The question is not limited to “humans” as a collection of selves defined as
consciousnesses, as one might think based on the discussion of Paulhan and Blanchot in
the first chapter. Rather, in this light, “humans” has to do with the non-dualistic complex
of consciousness situated in bodies. Proust drives his reader to ask not just how
consciousnesses enter history, but also how bodies do. Where Rilke sees earth only in the
objects surrounding him, Proust also sees it in himself. Indeed, for Proust, to move
beyond language—and history—as a source of pain, to be able to participate in it,
requires the recognition of the earth in the object and the earth in himself. The body, or
earth, is the bridge that corresponds across time and which enables language to pass.
With this correspondence in mind, one can look, then, at the incident of the
madeleine. Closing out the first section of “Combray,” it forms a matching bookend for
the magic lamp incident at the section’s beginning. It is also the first episode in Du côté
de chez Swann in which Marcel undergoes anagnorisis—here meaning the
transformation of language’s pain (mortality’s pain, history’s pain) into joy, if a joy that
Marcel only slowly begins to understand. Conducted through a series of leaping moves
across eleven paragraphs (though the second paragraph consists of only a single line), the
passage contains an intensity appropriate to joy but which is as hard for the careful reader
to understand as it is for Marcel.
Before proceeding with an analysis of the passage, it will perhaps be useful for
me to offer up an outline of its contents. First, Proust acknowledges Marcel’s limited
memories of the time he passed in Combray (those surrounding bedtime) and the way
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they stood out “in a building whose other part remains plunged in darkness.”84 He dubs
these memories as belonging to voluntary memory. Proust then transitions—using a
metaphor borrowed from “Celtic belief”85 in paragraphs two through five—to how
Marcel remembered more of Combray through the taste of a madeleine in tea, the
activation of corresponding sensations in his body across time. This kind of
remembering, reinforced through the paragraphs that follow, is, Proust suggests, the
complement of the memory already identified, namely, involuntary memory. He also
claims that this kind of remembering is largely the product of chance. Next Proust
describes Marcel’s process of remembering in paragraphs six through ten: how he had to
work repeatedly against his own mind, which refused to follow the sensation, and how
the memory finally came to him by breaking out of the depths within him. Last but not
least, in paragraph eleven, Proust describes the emergence of this other Combray—the
Combray he explores narratively and in more detail in the second part of “Combray”—
from his cup of tea.
There are a couple ways one might proceed with a discussion of this incident. For
my part, I think it best to begin by examining briefly the interpretive framework that
Proust embeds in the description of Marcel’s experience. After all, in addition to fraying
out the various forms of longing—desire for the comfort of the mother, for the
reciprocation of love, for the presence of someone long since dead—Proust, more so than
anywhere else in “Combray,” also propounds in the moments leading up to his
protagonist’s tea-washed epiphany. Indeed, part of the passage’s difficulty rests in the
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competition between the schema of interpretation Proust puts forward and the mode of
the text’s construction.
With regards to Proust’s framework, then, the most important aspects to keep in
mind are, first, his use of the body-bridge in order to distinguish between the two types of
memory he finds operational in his project (voluntary and involuntary), and, second, the
importance of chance to the revival of memory. As I have identified above, voluntary
memory, which Proust identifies as “the memory of the intelligence,” 86 that is, preformulated memory, memory already remembered as stories, suffers from a limited
ability to recall the past. Indeed, “the information it gives about the past preserves
nothing of the past itself,”87 but rather, in Marcel’s words, keeps it “all really quite dead
for me.”88 Involuntary memory, on the other hand, is memory triggered by the
correspondence of bodies. Proust makes this point clear—and very clearly situated within
the elegiac mode—through his choice of analogy. He introduces the concept via the
discussion of “the Celtic belief […] that the souls of those we have lost are held captive
in some inferior creature”89 waiting for one to recognize and thereby release them to
“return to live with us.”90 As with the lost soul, “the past is hidden outside the realm of
our intelligence and beyond its reach, in some material object (in the sensation that this
material object would give us).”91 Thus, Proust uses matching sensations of the body in
order to move between moments in time and to therefore allow a past moment to be, not
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remembered, but revived, relived and made available again as experience before narrative
dissection.
Chance also plays a role in this reanimation. The past cannot be revived in just
any fashion—after all, the revival of the past for Proust is a parallel procedure to the
ordeal for Rilke. For Proust, the path of involuntary memory combines chance—the
factor that he emphasizes at this point in Du côté de chez Swann—with sensitivity to the
body, methodical attentiveness, and skilled artistry—though the last of these qualities,
though implied through the text itself and the ambiguity of Proust and narrator Marcel, is
not yet dwelled on in Proust’s framing of his text (Proust saves that for the second part of
“Combray,” where he includes writing by the younger Marcel). You see, much as in the
writing of the surrealists who would follow Proust—think of Breton’s Nadja (Nadja)—
chance acts as a catalyst for the characters in the text, believably, while at the same time
obviously being a matter of persistence and staging and therefore not at all a matter of
chance. Again, one stands at the border between the body and language. It is for this
reason that art, and especially the art of language in literature, is so important.
In the case of the madeleine, however, while chance plays a key role in offering
up the object in which the past is stored—it is mere chance that Marcel’s “mother, seeing
that I was cold, suggested that, contrary to my habit, I have a little tea”92—it is by far the
least interesting part of the episode. Indeed, if anything, the emphasis on chance distracts
from the real work done in the passage about the madeleine. Marcel’s reaction to the
intrusion of something he cannot quite identify, what Deleuze calls “violence”93 but is
perhaps more properly called the unassimilable, as well as the manner in which he
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records this reaction are the more important parts, the preparatory parts, the parts where
investigation and aesthetics begin to play a role. Indeed, these, one might call them,
preparations of language allow Proust to process the unassimilable and transform it into
the thick weave for which he is known. Not to mention, it is this action that recalls the
discussion to its goal: to understand how one wrenches language from experience.
In his essay “Metonymy in Proust,”94 French literary theorist Gérard Genette
shows a sharp eye in analyzing Proust’s style as he tracks the relationship between
metaphor and metonymy in the Recherche. In particular, he argues that any analysis of
Proust’s use of metaphor that neglects to also address his use of metonymy fails to detect
an important component of the texture of Proust’s work. For indeed,
without metonymy, there is no sequencing of memories, no story/history, no
novel. For it is metaphor that regains Lost Time but it is metonymy that revives it
and sets it in motion, that gives it back to itself and to its veritable ‘essence,’
namely the flight-from-itself and the Search-for-itself that it is.95
In other words—and in a manner that echoes my conclusions above about Rilke and his
use of metaphor (figure)—metaphor allows for the transference of moments past into the
present. It serves as an access point to an articulation of that which is lost, that which
calls for elegy. It is the linguistic figure that binds together the body that, on the level of
the referent, is marked by sensations’ resemblance. However, while metaphor signals to
the transference—the possibility of transference, of re-routing of experience into
reference—it is metonymy, as Genette points out, that allows those moments of access to
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become wormholes into other worlds. It is metonymy that enables the joy that is central
to the elegiac work of the Recherche.
In the episode of the madeleine, these shifts are hard to detect. If Proust played
the episode of the magic lamp sforzato, this time, he goes for the long crescendo. To
approach it, however, I would like to focus in on paragraph six. Not only does this
paragraph serve as the structural midpoint of the eleven-paragraph sequence, but it is also
the paragraph in which all of Proust’s discussion of voluntary and involuntary memory
gets put to use. Proust has metaphorically linked up the “Celtic belief” about souls that
“have overcome death and […] return to live with us”96 to the act of memory—“It is the
same with our past.”97 Subsequently, in this paragraph, paragraph six, he can begin to
explore the implications. It is here, then, that Marcel starts the process of focusing his
attention on the sensation that the madeleine seems to trigger in him:
Et bientôt, machinalement, accablé par la morne journée et la perspective d’un
triste lendemain, je portai à mes lèvres une cuillerée du thé où j’avais laissé
s’amollir un morceau de madeleine. Mais à l’instant même où la gorgée mêlée
des miettes du gâteau toucha mon palais, je tressaillis, attentif à ce qui se passait
d’extraordinaire en moi. Un plaisir délicieux m’avait envahi, isolé, sans la notion
de sa cause. Il m’avait aussitôt rendu les vicissitudes de la vie indifférentes, ses
désastres inoffensifs, sa brièveté illusoire, de la même façon qu’opère l’amour, en
me remplissant d’une essence précieuse : ou plutôt cette essence n’était pas en
moi, elle était moi. J’avais cessé de me sentir médiocre, contingent, mortel. D’où
avait pu me venir cette puissante joie ? Je sentais qu’elle était liée au goût du thé
et du gâteau, mais qu’elle le dépassait infiniment, ne devait pas être de même
nature. D’où venait-elle ? Que signifiait-elle ? Où l’appréhender ?98
And soon, mechanically, oppressed by the gloomy day and the prospect of
another sad day to follow, I carried to my lips a spoonful of the tea in which I had
let soften a bit of madeleine. But at the very instant when the mouthful of tea
mixed with cake crumbs touched my palate, I quivered, attentive to the
extraordinary thing that was happening inside me. A delicious pleasure had
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invaded me, isolated me, without my having any notion as to its cause. It had
immediately rendered the vicissitudes of life unimportant to me, its disasters
innocuous, its brevity illusory, acting in the same way that love acts, by filling me
with a precious essence: or rather this essence was not merely inside me, it was
me. I had ceased to feel mediocre, contingent, mortal. Where could it have come
to me from—this powerful joy? I sensed that it was connected to the taste of the
tea and the cake, but that it went infinitely far beyond it, could not be of the same
nature. Where did it come from? What did it mean? How could I grasp it?99
Proust here describes the first moments of Marcel’s pivotal encounter with the madeleine
and the encroachment of involuntary memory. Conducted through stream of
consciousness, the description takes full advantage of Proust’s ability to slow down time.
Over a period of one hundred and fifty-eight words in French (or one hundred and ninety
in English), Proust manages to expand the few seconds it takes for Marcel to take a bite
of his cookie dipped in tea—and he will continue to expand it over more than three
pages, up through paragraph nine. In line with this expansion, one also begins to see
Proust shift his dependency from metaphor to metonymy. After all, at this stage, all
Marcel can determine of this event is that a “delicious pleasure” filled him for no
apparent reason. His body responds to the taste of the dipped cookie and that is where the
sensation registers—not as memory, not as narrative, not as a thing linguistically
structured, figured. Language instead circles around its subject, hinting, searching, as the
body-as-bridge begins to emerge and re-enforce the metaphor deployed in the first five
paragraphs of the madeleine episode. With this limited leaping between homologous
subjects, Proust becomes focused on what “was connected to the taste,” to the
governance of contiguity. Only once does he call out to sameness, the sameness of love,
and, as for that, as an analogy, it returns Proust to the territory of contiguity—among
love’s primary risks is the loss of the distinction between individuals. In doing so, in
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slowing down the pace of events and focusing on the connected, Proust thus allows
himself to make room for “the extraordinary thing that was happening inside me” and to
set up the inquiry that will ensue in the second half of the paragraph.
Likewise, in a gesture that matches this shifting focus of logical relations to
proximate ones, Proust explores performatively the interiority-exteriority conundrum
already highlighted in the previous chapter and which serves as the primary point of
contention in the process of Bildung. In the first part of paragraph six, the reader sees
Proust’s Marcel first turn “inside me,” a gesture that constitutes him simultaneously as
subject and object, before recognizing that it is the body that contains “a precious
essence” that “was not merely inside me, it was me.” In other words, Proust performs, in
a manner Rilke might admire for its figurative rigging, a movement of splitting and then
uniting his protagonist. In seeing himself as a thing filled with something else, Marcel
begins to see himself as an object. While not a move that would be effective with every
character (given that Bildung strives to standardize people and that only certain bodies—
traditionally, the straight, white, male norm—have been allowed to enter into history as
active and self-actualizing subjects), this objectification allows Marcel an important
scrambling of vantage points. It is as if he is watching himself being swept up into the
space of the social, being made into one body among many—all through the medium of
the language in which the narrator now writes. Of course, the real turn is the next step
where Marcel makes a great leap towards the anagnorisis that the mind calls for in light
of the body: the moment of realizing that he is also that which fills himself up. Even
when he is an object, he is also a subject. In other words, whereas in the case of the Golo
lamp of his childhood the exterior imposition of another world deepened his sadness, his
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sense of being erasable and contingent in the face of a history that did not allow him to
participate, in the case of the madeleine, the world rising up, that essence, is him. He can
thus begin to understand his limitations, thereby making himself back into a subject. For
it is only through this process of recognition of his own standing as earth that he can
comprehend himself as limited—as mortal—and have the potential to participate in
history.
It is also for this reason that the rest of the paragraph represents one of the most
triumphant, complicated, and paradoxical moments in Du côté de chez Swann. It strives
to represent the moment in which sensation transforms into re-lived memory (the moment
of anagnorisis). However, Proust is re-presenting it—i.e. communicating it through the
medium of language—and therefore, it would seem, undercutting the living nature of the
encounter. It would do so, if Proust’s aim were not twofold: on the one hand, to defer the
future by being able to enter the Open, and, on the other, to be able to rejoin history as a
participant. Proust does not just want to reach the moment of anagnorisis, of revelation;
he also wants to be able to live in light of that revelation—to convert his grief into a ritual
of mourning. As Genette states in a similar moment of descriptive adroitness on the part
of Proust, he wants to “customiz[e] it among the various analogic virtualities.”100 One
might call this Proust’s effort to incorporate his own death:
Je bois une seconde gorgée où je ne trouve rien de plus que dans la première, une
troisième qui m’apporte un peu moins que la seconde. Il est temps que je
m’arrête, la vertu du breuvage semble diminuer. Il est clair que la vérité que je
cherche n’est pas en lui, mais en moi. Il l’y a éveillée, mais ne la connaît pas, et
ne peut que répéter indéfiniment, avec de moins en moins de force, ce même
témoignage que je ne sais pas interpréter et que je veux au moins pouvoir lui
redemander et retrouver intact, à ma disposition, tout à l’heure, pour un
éclaircissement décisif. Je pose la tasse et me tourne vers mon esprit. C’est à lui
100
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de trouver la vérité. Mais comment ? Grave incertitude, toutes les fois que l’esprit
se sent dépassé par lui-même ; quand lui, le chercheur, est tout ensemble le pays
obscur où il doit chercher et où tout son bagage ne lui sera de rien. Chercher ?
pas seulement : créer. Il est en face de quelque chose qui n’est pas encore et que
seul il peut réaliser, puis faire entrer dans sa lumière.101
I drink a second mouthful, in which I find nothing more than in the first, a third
that gives me a little less than the second. It is time for me to stop, the virtue of
the drink seems to be diminishing. Clearly, the truth I am seeking is not in the
drink, but in me. The drink has awoken it in me, but does not know this truth, and
can do no more than repeat indefinitely, with less and less force, this same
testimony which I do not know how to interpret and which I want at least to be
able to ask of it again and find again, intact, available to me, soon, for a decisive
clarification. I put down the cup and turn to my mind. It is up to my mind to find
the truth. But how? Such grave uncertainty, whenever the mind feels overtaken by
itself; when it, the seeker, is also the obscure country where it must seek and
where all its baggage will be nothing to it. Seek? Not only that: create. It is faceto-face with something that does not yet exist and that only it can accomplish,
then bring into its light.102
In this paragraph, there are quite a few clues as to Proust’s burgeoning awareness of what
involuntary memory is enabling him to do, the possibilities awakened. In addition to the
continuing pursuit of connection, there is the matter of the change in tense. Up until this
point, Proust has described the past as past and has made full use of the past tenses
available in French, even when excavating it. Here, however, beginning with “I drink a
second mouthful,”103 Proust switches to the present—and he stays in the present until the
moment when, four paragraphs later in paragraph ten, he announces how “suddenly the
memory appeared.”104 What makes this choice interesting is how it insists on the present
tense for the staging of Marcel’s experiment: his testing of himself and of the cause of the
pleasure he experienced when taking a bite of the madeleine needed to happen in this
realm of possibility, when he can still admit that he “do[es] not know how to interpret
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[this truth].” Indeed, in almost Dostoevskian fashion, Proust uses the present to extend
the moment before remembering, before deciding how to remember and what to “create.”
The experiment happens in the Open before language—prefigured by the next
paragraph’s “murmur of the distances traversed” 105—forces it into the stream of history,
thereby closing the initial metaphor, when the memory arises from the teacup in a form
Marcel can manage well enough to tell his readers, one which, it is implied, will be the
basis for the rest of the book.
If Rilke wanted to understand how utopic time might be accessed, Proust wanted
to understand how it might be lived with through real time. His novel, which begins with
insomnia and works through a desire and failure to produce work, captures the possession
of the Bildungsroman by the elegy. After all, the mind struggling towards business,
towards the occupation of time, comes up short, cannot build very much. It is the body in
action and the mind at rest that creates the chance for anagnorisis for Proust. Only after
this moment of the stalled-out present that belongs to the Open can language re-activate
and properly take up time.
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CHAPTER 3
MICHAUX

1.
Approximately thirty years and another world war after the publication of the
Duineser Elegien and Proust’s Du côté de chez Swann, Henri Michaux returned to the
elegiac challenge. Rather than casting for utopic time through allegory as Rilke had done,
or seeking to exchange utopic time for real time as Proust had done, Michaux instead
sought to resituate the experiment of the Open at the intersection of scientific and
religious practice, in a form of real-infinite time. He did so through the procedural
ingestion of a series of drugs—though primarily mescaline—over the course of several
years beginning on January 2, 1955.106 The states he entered under their influence he then
recorded through writing and drawing and eventually curated in a series of five books:
Misérable miracle (Miserable Miracle) (1956, 1972), L’Infini turbulent (Infinite
Turbulence) (1957, 1964), Paix dans les brisements (Peace in the Breakage) (1959),
Connaissance par les gouffres (Light through Darkness) (1961, 1967), and Les Grandes
Épreuves de l’Esprit et les innombrables petites (The Major Ordeals of the Mind and
Innumerable Small Ones) (1966). In serializing his drug experiences, Michaux, like Rilke
and especially like Proust, demonstrates his interest in Bildung through the process of
revision in relation to life—even going so far as to expand and reissue three of the five
books, as is reflected in the multiple publication dates.
For Michaux, as for Rilke and Proust, the idea of Bildung is narrated not only
through the story of his work’s production, however. It is also built into the narrative arc
106
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of the books themselves and therefore made available for consideration by the reader. In
this chapter, I will look into Misérable miracle, the first of these books—and also the last
of them as a result of revision—in which Bildung manifests itself through elegiac
contestation. Although Michaux never identifies the motivation for his experiments in
either the published texts or in letters with his co-conspirators (Jean Paulhan and Edith
Boissonnas)—it seems likely that the prolonged suffering and eventual death of MarieLouise Michaux by fire in February 1948107 was a factor. Michaux had reached the limit
of what he could handle, and the spiritualism to which he had turned, according to
friends, immediately after her death was not sustaining him. 108 In order to reconcile
himself to death, Michaux planned on using mescaline—and the real-infinite, the
“corporeal infinity,” that he might discover through it109—to negotiate the space of limitexperience, wherein personal language and history contend.

2.
We should again begin the discussion with considerations of genre. As already
mentioned, elegy is a poetic form reinvented in the eighteenth century in light of interest
in Bildung. Although its formal features were limited (and continued to slough off in
increasingly modern iterations of the genre), it does possess an arc from grief to
anagnorisis. Indeed, this trajectory is what holds together its ritualization of mourning
through reconciliation with death. Such is the outline of the work an elegy is meant to do.
When it comes to Misérable Miracle, however, although Michaux is primarily
known as a poet, poetry is not the form he chooses to use. Or rather, it is not the only
107
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form. The book is composed of four kinds of materials: the prose that forms the primary
body of the text, “des raccourcis”110 or “epitomes”111 running along the outer margins of
the pages; groupings of drawings done just after the drug dosing; and pages from
Michaux’s handwritten notes made during the course of the experiences. Interleaved
together, these media form into four segments—“Avec la mescaline” (“With Mescaline”),
“Caractères de la mescaline” (“Characteristics of Mescaline”), “Le Chanvre indien:
Notes pour server à un parallèle entre deux hallucinogènes” (“Indian Hemp: Notes to
Serve as a Comparison Between Two Hallucinogens”), and “Expérience de la folie”
(“Experimental Schizophrenia”)—accompanied by introductory and summary remarks
and a series of addenda. The progression through these sections, while seemingly
experimental—that is, organized chronological in correlation with the dosages—is
actually a carefully constructed narrative, moving from initial trials up to and through an
ordeal. In the first of these books, “With Mescaline,” Michaux describes the experience
of being on mescaline in terms of its effects on his self. Midway through, Michaux
includes a series of drawings of the “sillon”112 or “fissure”113 that invades his field of
inner vision and which seems to be his record of his self splitting open. The chapter then
finishes with excerpts from his notes, thereby including a signature of Michaux’s state of
mind at the time of ingestion of the drug. In the next section, “Characteristics of
Mescaline,” Michaux concerns himself with describing mescaline as an actor, the way it
works as a “disorder of composition”114 that is “above all interested in covering
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ground.”115 In the third of these parts, “Indian Hemp,” Michaux experiments with hashish
in order to create another point of reference for the effects of mescaline on perception.
Finally, Michaux caps his experiments with a fourth trial of mescaline in “Experimental
Schizophrenia” (the first three experiments with mescaline were described in “With
Mescaline” and “Characteristics of Mescaline”), during which Michaux overdoses,
supposedly accidentally. Michaux begins his mescaline experiment as merely “an
exploration. By means of words, signs, drawings. Mescaline, the subject explored.”116
However, through the moment of the overdose, he rigs the experiment—just as Rilke
rigged his figuration—in search of a revelation, not about mescaline at all, but about
himself. Michaux submerges himself in mescaline in order to make the discovery that
would allow for the moment of anagnorisis.

3.
The relationship between language and the body is much more complicated in
Michaux’s work than it is in either the Duineser Elegien or Du côté de chez Swann. For
Rilke, the body hardly appears at all, showing up only as one of the many elements that
compose the worldly ineffable, and even then only by implication—Rilke prefers to keep
the body (and the other) at a distance. Proust, on the other hand, grounds his literary
practice in the body. As the receptor of the world’s sensations, the body serves as the
bridge between corresponding moments in time. Without it, there is no entry point into
history and no material for language to carve its path through and into art. When it comes
to Michaux, however, the body is very much in charge, to a degree even Michaux
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sometimes finds uncomfortable. For, although his plan had certainly been to surrender
himself to the drug, it is not clear that he understood what that would mean; he seems
consistently surprised by mescaline’s “easy seductions”117 and the way in which its
alteration of his body chemistry alters him.118 Indeed, Michaux does not seem to
understand the difference in the stakes between his earlier works—in which he, according
to critic Carrie Noland, “experiments with the gestures of sign making in order to find a
performing body beyond them”119—and his mescaline writings, in which the body and
the mind are implicated together in a process of distortion. As British psychiatrist
Humphrey Osmand puts it in a letter to Louise Varèse, the English translator of
Misérable miracle, dated 4 June 1960, “[o]ne feels that [Michaux] intended to be a
spectator & in some unexpected way he was caught & resented this.”120 Michaux’s
insides and outsides, his private mental observation deck and his acting body, to
Michaux’s surprise and chagrin, turned out to be interlinked. Mescaline would not
provide an out-of-body experience that Michaux could watch.
Michaux instead found himself buffeted on the waves of mescaline competing
with his self. In order to conceptualize this competition, however, Michaux approaches
mescaline as if it were, like himself, an artist. Michaux—the Michaux that Michaux
recognizes—and mescaline are each described as producing a variety of signs, each
writing in his/its own style, alphabet, language. These signs are what Michaux attempts to
describe in some cases, and record in others, for his readers. Although it is difficult to
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define clear events in Misérable miracle (a risk whenever experiment dominates a
narrative), encounters between the two languages do seem to occur, moments where
Michaux recognizes that “Mescaline and [he] were more often at odds with each other
than together.” 121 In particular, Michaux shows interest in what happens to natural
language when it appears in the mescalinian mind. He had gone in search of infinity—
perhaps something like the utopic time which Rilke hoped to find, through language, a
time alleviated in which the dead appeared. However, instead of coextensive infinity,
Michaux, in moving his infinite from the virtual into the real, stumbles into serial infinity.
Mescaline, “by the speed of its components, got beyond the possibility of measurement
and precluded the very idea of counting and appraising, ”122 thus “bec[oming] a ‘model’
of the infinite.”123 Michaux thus finds that mescaline unfolds language just like everyone
else—only at a different pace and to a different degree. Whereas people tend to follow
syntax and changes in logic or image when they move through language, mescaline has
only one rule: “[a]ssociated with words, [it] proceeds by enumeration.”124 It does not
pause. It does not dig in—to life, to texture, to sentiment, to body. Instead, it glides along
the surface of thought, “the enemy of poetry,”125 with “[a]n image appear[ing], only if
evoked by a thought, a word, an abstraction.”126
In identifying this shift in the nature of the infinity at stake in mescaline,
manifested in the execution of language by the drug, I have also pointed towards the
transference of infinite time from the virtual into the real—a transference that mirrors
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Michaux’s transference of the rigging from the syntactic, as in Rilke’s work, to the
bodily. It is important to acknowledge this fact before turning to the other side of the
equation that I have begun. Michaux does not just submit natural language to mescaline;
mescaline also submits mescalinian language to Michaux’s body. I mentioned earlier the
two primary types of graphics present in Misérable miracle: drawings, fairly abstract, of
the furrow that rends Michaux’s interior vision and Michaux’s handwriting samples,
which act as signatures of the state of Michaux’s consciousness.127 In addition to these
two types of graphics—which seem to hold a status within the text equivalent to any of
the writing contained therein—however, Michaux also includes, in the second section,
“Characteristics of Mescaline,” what instead might be described as a diagram or
illustration:
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Image 1: Michaux’s Mescaline Alphabets 128

In it, one sees a return to Michaux’s earlier interest in alphabets and the use of “the
format of a child’s primer” already explored in his 1951 Mouvements (Movements). 129
Different kinds of lines, zigzags are organized into blocks divided by lines, emphasizing
both their distinctness and their variation—as if they were, indeed, letters (Paulhan seems
to have had similar suspicions130) that might be repeated over and over again, that one
might train oneself to control and use. Indeed, although Michaux does not say so
explicitly, only hinting as he calls them “vibrations et formes élémentaires” in the first
line of the caption below, these different lines seem to be more controlled imitations of
the lines that appear in Michaux’s furrowed drawings. In the first of the furrow drawings,
which appears part way through “With Mescaline,” one sees the furrow as composed
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through a series of dense, tornado-like lines somewhat reminiscent of the figure of the
scribble in the upper right-hand corner of the primer. The last of the furrow drawings in
“With Mescaline” shows the same dense markings as in all of the first furrow near its
centerline, though its edges are drawn via a series of looser, back-and-forth gestures that
bud into loops at their ends, in a fashion resembling the two lines immediately below the
one looked at earlier in the primer.
The point, of course, of articulating such resemblances is that the lines contained
in the primer are Michaux’s attempt to document the mescalinian alphabet—and thus the
mescalinian possession. Just as Proust found his encounter with the magic lamp to be a
matter of possession by another story, so too does Michaux find his with mescaline—the
terms of the encounter are simply different. Mescaline does not tell stories. It perpetrates
only repeated abstractions, non-signifying signs. Though a product of Michaux’s body, it
does not feel body. It cannot.
It is likely for this reason that Michaux’s mescaline primer is situated within the
context of a discussion of the gods. Mescaline is a drug synthesized from peyote, which,
while possessing its own long history, holds a particular place in twentieth-century
French literature. French writer, actor, and theater theorist Antonin Artaud took peyote in
1936 in an attempt both to distance himself from the European culture he considered
poisonous and to detox after serious heroin abuse.131 Michaux may not have suffered
from drug addiction (at least when he started taking mescaline; the waters get murkier as
he tries a variety of drugs over the next two decades), but he was suffering from a desire
to distance himself from the European culture and institutions that had inflicted WWII on
the world. That is part of Michaux’s elegiac project, after all. In taking mescaline,
131

Artaud, 15.

62

Michaux sought to accomplish what he had in his youth accomplished through, as he
would write a few years later in 1957, “voyage contre.”132 He had traveled against, in the
first place against geography. With mescaline, however, he traveled against the self that
had been geographically and culturally defined. As a result, when he turned to mescaline,
he also turned to the gods it might bring, gods that might appear and return his gaze
where Rilke’s Angel had been indifferent. The Tarahumara stands in contrast, for
Michaux, to “l’Occidental d’à présent."
It is thus to the Tarahumara that Michaux turns when it comes to language as the
key to the gods—though, in fact, one wonders if this relationship was the reason
mescaline was the drug of choice in the first place, its potential for verbal evocation. As
Michaux points out,
They sought a god seeking the Peyotl, and the other gods, incited by the solemnity
of the sacramental act, were never far off. The gods of volcanoes, of fire, of
harvests, of rain, the god of the stars and of the Universe. It was enough for an
Indian to pronounce the name of the god he worshiped, for the god, by order of
the word, to appear.
What we learn in demonology seems now quite clear: that the name is
everything. Here verified.
The demon, once called, even if he does not exist, will appear to anyone
who, being in the second state, has had the imprudence or the audacity of
pronouncing his name.133
The Tarahumara took peyote as part of a religious rite through which they sought the
presence of the gods. In Michaux’s interpretation, however, these encounters with deities
are the product of the same phenomenon that he experiences with mescaline: a sign (a
word) generates an image, never the other way around. Thus, one names a god and that
god manifests—or at least, something manifests that looks like what the speaker expects
132
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from the name. For although Michaux does not want to dismiss the gods of the
Tarahumara—that was never the point of this experiment—he does want to bring the
discovery of verbally manifested gods back into the fold of European thinking. Thus he
returns to demonology, noting the power the name usually embraces and, in point of fact,
the emptiness of the demon that the name conjures. In other words, it positions Michaux
to ask what it would mean if gods were only things conjured up by words—not only
because of how that would demote divinity, but also because of how it would raise up
language.

4.
Here, one arrives yet again at the apotheosis of language. Whereas Rilke
identified language as supreme because it is both that which forces humanity into
awareness of its own frailty and death and that which allows humanity to continue after
death, Michaux comes to a similar conclusion by another angle. For him, language is the
medium through which humanity has created its divinities. Thus, instead of finding earth
on a mountaintop and returning to the valley with a word, Michaux focuses on how
language, once spoken, conjures earth, real or not (and demons, real or not).
The consequences of language’s elevation are not small. However, to understand
their full implications, one must consider what the projective power of language means
for several key points in this discussion, especially bodies, the Open, and history. I have
discussed already the emptying of the sign that takes place with mescaline—i.e.
disembodiment as an abstraction that operates solipsistically and that is only capable of
producing itself. In some ways, this fact allies mescaline with the idea I discussed in the
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first chapter in opposing reflective language to the sort of language I decided to promote,
language that reaches out of the abyss of the self and into the well of linguistic social
norms. Both reflection and mescaline operate by the scary rule of repetition without
difference—or at least, they approach such a method asymptotically within the context of
infinity. After all, if a word is repeated successively forever, how much difference really
exists between the hundredth and the hundred and first time it occurs, or the thousandth
or the thousand and first?
In fact, this asymptotic elimination of difference is limit-experience. As Deleuze
says, “[d]ifference is what constitutes being, what makes us conceive being.”134 In other
words, limit-experience is that which eliminates the particularity of being—almost—in
favor of something like Being, and which also coincides with non-existence. It is
experience that wonders about and at the coincidence of everything and nothing. More
importantly, for my purposes, it considers the passage towards death and negotiates the
moment of death that elegy wants to avoid acknowledging and yet must acknowledge, in
order to carry out its purpose.
Of course, if repetition is the mechanism of concern with mescaline, that also
means time is as well, and perhaps all of history. The limit-experience of mescaline
operates in a time unlike those explored by Rilke and Proust—one that unfolds but has no
meaning, no difference, in its unfolding, no sense of progression, as every moment
resembles every other moment. Most importantly, while it is a form of time without
future, it is not a time with possibility, as is the time of the Open. This contradiction
seems to be the site of difficulty for Michaux. On the one hand, as Michaux reports, “[o]n

134

Deleuze, 41.

65

that sensational Sunday when [he] was able to change times, [he] lived in security.” 135
On the other hand, the security of that time is still subject to the questionability of the
vision. Mescaline seems to respond to anything conjured in language. Name the demon;
see the demon. Name the god; see the god. The god thus becomes suspect. Mescalinian
time becomes suspect. Security becomes suspect again. Mescaline does not actually
provide the relief of utopic existence in real time. The succession of mescalinian instants
become so similar that they resemble stasis, and are filled with language’s phantoms.
For this reason, it is also clear that, in taking mescaline, Michaux has
problematized the circuit of history—or even opted out of it. He delays the flow of
language, which, thinking back to Rilke, derives its power from its simultaneous ability
to linger and to become. Of course, Michaux, too, makes efforts to bring his ordeal back
to history—he writes about his experiments with mescaline and publishes those writings.
However, it is not clear Michaux is actually eager to return, or if the return is instead
merely the automatic completion of the project with which he set out. In other words, the
return is a necessary component of the elegiac challenge—the poet must return with the
word from the mountaintop, must complete the second ordeal—rather than the product of
any real anagnorisis.
This assertion is supported by a number of factors. There is the fact that Michaux
goes on to write another four books after Misérable miracle, documenting other attempts
to use drugs to compel Michaux through mourning and into comfort with death. There is
also the matter of the addenda to Misérable miracle. In them, Michaux wonders about
younger generations and their use of drugs and acknowledges that, while “[a]vec les
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années, [il] avai[t] fait des progrès…vers des états importants, vers ceux qui comptent”136
(“[o]ver the years, [he] made progress…nearing the important states, nearing the ones
that count”137), that drugs could not accomplish everything he thought they could and still
controlled him more than he controlled them. Finally, there is the matter of the attempted
overdose, when Michaux, by “une erreur de calcul”138 (“an error of calculation”139), took
six times the recommended dosage140—easily enough for the damage from the mescaline
to have been permanent, if not fatal. It seems as if Michaux was trying to force his
reconciliation with the limit in order to obtain that final point in the elegiac arc.
Though Michaux says little about history, it is easy to understand, from what he
does say, why he might not be eager to return to historical time. One sees in Michaux’s
work three different kinds of time competing: the time of mescaline, the time of
information, and the time of the story. I have already discussed mescalinian time—it is
the time of modeled infinity. However, what this kind of time was meant to assuage,
through reconstitution in the elegiac form, was the traumatic rift between the two other
kinds of time, borrowed from Benjamin’s “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”—
informational time and the time of the story. The incompatibility of these two forms of
time is how Benjamin explains twentieth-century trauma. It is not only a matter of
devastating loss of life and the failure of Bildung; it is also a question of the pace of life
and the incomprehensibility of the individual to that pace. According to Benjamin, the
“communication, produced in response to the heightened intensities of industrial
capitalism, and ‘the boundless maze of indirect relationships, complex mutual
136
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dependencies and compartmentations’ of the city”141 corresponds “to the interruptive,
amnesiac temporality of shock.”142 In other words, the rush of mechanical life, divided
and speeding, has a corresponding mode of interpretation by human consciousness:
“consciousness shields the self from such shocks by registering them without retaining
them, protecting the organism against over-stimulation by isolating them from memory.
Memory becomes unconscious.”143 The mind refuses to synthesize its experiences, but
rather allows them to fall to the side. All of which is to say, individuals in the twentieth
century are overwhelmed by stimulus, by information, and find themselves unable to
shape such information into narrative, into story. Time in the twentieth century has
become, like Rilke’s Angel, increasingly indifferent to history and its constitution
through the articulation of the experience of individuals.
For Michaux, this conflict is staged in terms of spirituality and religion, though in
different terms than its staging by Rilke. Indeed, Michaux thinks of time as the nihilistic
deity of western thought:
Quant à l’Occidental d’à présent, depuis longtemps incroyant aux dieux, et qui
serait bien incapable d’imaginer une forme sous laquelle ils seraient susceptibles
de lui apparaître, ce que son esprit saisit, seul dieu qu’il aperçoive encore et qu’il
serait vain d’adorer, c’est l’infinie relativité, la cascade qui n’a pas de
terminaison, la cascade des causes et des effets, ou plutôt des précédents ou des
suivants, où tout est roue entraînte et roue entraînée.144
As for the Westerner today, so long an unbeliever in the gods and now incapable
of imagining a form in which they might appear to him, what his mind grasps, the
only god he can still conceive, a god it would be vain to worship, is infinite
relativity, the unending cascade, the cascade of causes and effects, or rather of
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what goes before and of what comes after, where everything is driving wheel and
follower wheel.145
The Western God is nothing, Michaux argues, but relativity. It no longer has available to
it any kind of utopic time or messianic time, both of which tend to be eschatological or at
least teleological in nature, because the Western imagination falls short in its ability to
create narrative. It cannot perceive anything more than motion falling forward into more
motion, into the next moment. It cannot synthesize into, as Benjamin says, the time of
story, but can only take part in the furious multiplication of data points, facts,
information. And of course, how could it—the Western imagination and god, products of
language—possibly handle elegy in a fashion that is anything more than nihilistic
resignation to being crushed beneath the wheels of time?
For Benjamin, Proust’s turn to the body and to involuntary memory was the best
answer available, for through it, he managed to become as close to a modern storyteller
as possible. However, for Michaux, storytelling no longer works. He has lived too long in
informational time. Instead of seeking to repair it into the time of story, he looks for a
time that can handle the dissipation—that can collect it. It is for this reason that, in
Misérable miracle, the body of the text functions as a record more than as a story
synthesized from experience. In this way, Michaux might be said to use Benjamin’s
theory of translation—which, like Paulhan and Blanchot’s sees the translation of
experience into language as the problem standing, finally, behind the issue of translation
between languages—as a response to Benjamin’s assessment of the replacement of the
story (and history) by information and its infinite relativity. In it, Benjamin argues that,
“[w]hile, in fact, all the individual elements—words, sentences, contexts—in foreign
145
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languages exclude each other, in their intentions the languages supplement each other.”146
In other words, while foreign languages fail to reflect each other, they do act in parallel
with regards to what they are attempting to enact. Furthermore, the flurry of information,
while not necessarily synthesizable, may be grouped. For Michaux, that means that he
can use the different media—prose, margin-filling epitomes, drawings, and handwriting
samples—as different languages to triangulate around the limit-experience of mescaline.
They can prop up the experimental form appropriate to the elegy within the context of the
new informational time, as exposed—modeled—in mescaline.
Thus, one arrives at Michaux’s answer to elegy: the modeled infinity of
mescaline. In the wake of the felt impossibility of story, Michaux sought to make
something out of its replacement, informational time, by reconsidering the possibility of
reconciling with death through the elegy and its ritualization of mourning. However,
Michaux had to figure out a way to promise anagnorisis even when he himself could not
provide it. To do so, he recorded the language battle staged in the non-historical time of
mescaline, the time without future, wherein he hoped to find the divine. While
mescalinian time also proved to lack the possibilities of the Open and no god showed
itself as more than a product of language, Michaux also—like Rilke and Proust—found
that language, specifically the language of his multiple mescalinian translations tracking
his rigged body, was enough to bind together the moment of crisis and, as Felman
suggested was necessary, contain it.
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CONCLUSION

In the chapters above, I have traced the elegiac negotiations operative in Rilke’s
Duineser Elegien, Proust’s Du côté de chez Swann, and Michaux’s Misérable miracle.
Although each work results from a specific encounter with death, these works also
capture responses to an era, the traumatic twentieth century, and to the struggle for
rapprochement between the individual and the new, inhuman time that emerged from the
industrial revolution. In particular, Rilke, Proust, and Michaux challenged the
assumptions of Bildung. As the cultural education of the individual that emerged out of
the Enlightenment and which underpinned literature, pedagogy, and politic alike, Bildung
was losing its footing amidst its new realities. To be shaped into the citizen idealized in
Bildung required one to be white, male, straight, and capitalistically productive (wellsuited to mechanical time), eliding all other possibilities. It also, in the context of the
mass death re-shaping the political and military landscape, required the citizen to become
dispensable. The result was that Bildung idealized a construct of self that eliminated the
individual. Experience’s new texture became one of trauma, of unabsorbable shock, of
death without the time or space for ritualization, reconciliation, or accommodation. In
opposition to these developments, then, writers like Rilke, Proust, and Michaux rekindled a commitment to elegy, to the narrative it offered, and to the possibility of
anagnorisis at its core. For them, elegy served as a potential form for re-writing historical
indifference and for preparing, through limit-experience and loss, linguistic antidotes for
the elision of difference produced in history’s wake.
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Of course, none of this is to say that these elegiac efforts were aware of each other
or even that the strategies Rilke, Proust, and Michaux each deployed necessarily
developed a consistent trajectory—though the results, I think, are suggestive. Indeed, as I
have argued above, each felt his own way through elegy, through the absence of a clear
relationship between the individual and history, toward possible reinventions of the form.
In the case of the Duineser Elegien, Rilke secularizes the classical elegy by rigging an
Angel into a figure of divine indifference: outside of time, they are unaware of human
suffering and death. Instead, the poet of Rilke’s Elegien must turn away from the divine
and back toward the human—i. e. away from God and towards language—a feat that
Rilke manages through the literal and figurative elevation offered by the trope of
mountaintop revelations. He is able to invert the tradition of God descending to earth
through the Word, replacing it with the Word pulling earth from the mountain itself.
Language, Rilke claims, is what reveals the idea of the “future” to people, what
introduces humans to history. At the same time, however, language is the only thing
capable of defying history—of outlasting it—and, when properly used, of bringing the
earth with it. The writing of the poem becomes the author’s way of re-asserting the
individual. The textual body of Rilke’s elegy, then, not only does the speculative work of
thinking through the collision of modernity’s impersonality with the fact of individual
loss and mourning, but it also becomes a demonstration of the frame of capture: it enacts
the way in which language—the language of a specific historical moment—maintains
circulation, life, through literary work, through registering the precise word, and without
any need for sacred communications. In doing so, Rilke accesses what he calls the
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“Open,” which seems to be the utopic time in which possibilities exist without the closure
of impending future.
In Du côté de chez Swann, Proust is likewise concerned with the power of his
linguistic medium and of the textual body implicated in the confrontation of the
individual with history. In this case, Proust has taken the elegiac impulse and funneled it
into the Bildungsroman, the novelistic exploration that emerged concomitant with the
concept of Bildung. Proust has also, however, concerned himself with another body, the
body of his protagonist, Marcel. In doing so, in giving attention to the physicality of
Marcel’s body, to its potential to conjure, Proust manages to re-purpose the
Bildungsroman, usually reserved for a discussion of the individual as a citizen—i.e. in the
context of the nation—as a novel about the development of a person as an individual in
an individual body. The gap between these two modes allows Proust to emphasize the
confrontation between individual and history that is essential to elegy, to retract the
search for a ritual of mourning back into lived time, and to re-situate it within a
hermeneutics based in embodiment. Language again acts as a mediator; yet, it does so
most powerfully when triggered by the body’s memory in episodes like that of the
madeleine, in which a combination of metaphor and metonymy gather bodily sensations
into narrative possibility. The utopic time pointed towards by Rilke through the
suggestiveness of the word becomes, with Proust, a time regained by coiling within
textual passage.
With Michaux’s Misérable miracle, the balance between textual body and human
body tips toward the weight of the human. Mescalinian infinity—“corporeal infinity”—
becomes the goal of this multimedia, autoethnographic lab report. However in doing so,
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Michaux’s return to the concerns of Rilke and Proust becomes a more extreme iteration.
Although language retains its status as key witness to experience—and key collaborator
in resisting experience’s disintegration—it relinquishes its ability to answer the elegiac
challenge by reconciling the writer with death on its own. Instead, Michaux situates the
burden of response in the body. It is the body—the protagonist’s body and the author’s—
that has to be rigged; to this end, Michaux ingests six times the recommended mescaline
dosage and submits himself to possession by the drug. The result, however, is not an
infinity like the extensive one anticipated by Rilke but is rather a serial infinity resulting
from repetition—which leaves for Michaux much of the same ambivalence with which he
began. On the one hand, it gives him access to limit-experience, the asymptotic
elimination of difference, which bridges life and death (among other things), and removes
the pressure of the future. On the other hand, possibility—which entails variation,
meaning, and thus narrative—is also, for the most part, foreclosed by the use of
homogenizing replication. Mescalinian infinity as channeled by Michaux into a curated
collection of fragments thus suggests a way of gathering the body and its sign into an
elegiac mode nonetheless compatible history’s indifference.
In Rilke, Proust, and Michaux’s works, then, one sees tested the degree to which
language—as it circulates in the social space where it makes history, nations, and even
consciousnesses possible—can be responsive to the individual embodied. How can
language bridge the gap between one body and the swarm? Can it grab it through the
senses? Can it gather it up into a world? Can it be not just representational, but also a
trace? The language of elegy is utilitarian. It is language sustaining and containing,
reconciling crisis—the crisis of being human, human limits. To deploy it, to engage in
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elegiac writing, it is to make demands of author and reader alike. I began this thesis
softly, Benjamin’s call to the state of emergency figuring as a familiar reference point.
However, his call is toward the ponderousness of events sliding by unnoticed—and to
that not noticing. While I am not sure if there is for Benjamin a hazardous nostalgia
underlying this call (perhaps to a time, and a kind of time, in which people noticed?), I do
think it safe to say that he identified well the call sensed by the writers I have here
addressed and who were his contemporaries. Rilke, Proust, and Michaux wrote new
iterations of elegy that sought to reground history in the experience of the body that is the
source of human limitation, both in terms of the death it suffers and the hermeneutics that
it permits. Thus, while their works, their attention to language and its possibilities, in no
way solve the issues at stake, in them, one can nonetheless find strategies for resisting,
narratively, the indifferent winds of history and for re-introducing into history the body of
the individual upon which the marks to be noticed are inscribed.
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